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ABSTRACT
Although Hong Kong is a party to the Convention for the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
and has enacted legislation to safeguard women’s rights, the existing
framework of protection is inadequate in critical respects and fails
to achieve substantive equal protection for women. This paper ex-
amines existing law and policy governing women’s rights and identi-
fies the underlying causes for its continued failings. It identifies
some of the key gaps that render women continually vulnerable to
discriminatory treatment. This paper concludes by outlining rec-
ommendations for achieving the goals of substantive and transfor-
mative equality for women.
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INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong represents a unique society in that it is full of con-
tradictions. It characterizes both modernity and the conservatism
of a bygone era. Whilst the former colony has put into place consti-
tutional protections and legislative provisions to guarantee the equal
protection of women’s rights, the current state of the law and juris-
prudence has left the situation of women precarious and wanting.
Part I provides a very brief historical overview of Hong Kong’s
transition from a colony to a Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China. Part II outlines relevant legislative pro-
visions that protect the human rights of women in Hong Kong,1 un-
derscoring Hong Kong’s international obligations to enact such laws
and their constitutional entrenchment under the Hong Kong Basic
Law.2 Part III charts the enactment of relevant anti-discrimination
statutes in Hong Kong. It sets out the institutional framework put
into place to protect against violations of women’s rights to equality
and non-discrimination. In the process, it discusses related jurispru-
dence emanating from the Hong Kong courts.3 Part IV discusses
other legislation that impacts the rights of women.4
In evaluating the effectiveness of this framework, this paper
argues that it falls short of international standards in numerous re-
spects and undermines the rights of women.5 Evidentiary burdens,
coupled with impediments in access to justice, renders the institu-
tional protections available less than satisfactory. This results in the
withdrawal or non-pursuit of claims by women.6 As the examples
discussed will show, apart from the procedural obstacles to achiev-
ing effective enforcement, the courts, whilst progressive in terms of
ascertaining the perpetration of discrimination from a substantive
understanding of equality, are unduly deferential to the executive
and legislative branches, in particular when claims have implica-
tions on economic or social rights and policies.7 The courts’ reluc-
tance to exercise their powers of strict scrutiny where the fundamental
right to equality is concerned exacerbates the plight of women and
particularly hurts segments of the female population who already
suffer from discrimination on multiple grounds.8 These examples
1. See discussion infra Parts I–II.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
8. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
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also reveal the underdeveloped nature of arguments relating to
equality and intersectional discrimination which are rarely put be-
fore the courts. Hence, the jurisprudence on these concepts which are
key to addressing invidious and deep-rooted discrimination, trails be-
hind international jurisprudence. These examples include: access to
the right abode for Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong; the right
to health and obstetric services at equal costs for mainland mothers
delivering babies in Hong Kong hospitals; and the rights of trans-
sexual women to marry a partner of their choosing. The paper con-
cludes with recommendations on how the protection of women’s rights
can be enhanced.9 It is imperative for the government to institution-
alize gender mainstreaming with a view to enabling effective plan-
ning in policy and legal developments to advance the interests of
women and protect them against direct and indirect forms of dis-
crimination and other violations of their fundamental human rights.
Such reform should be urgently prioritized in light of the actual and
hidden costs of inadequate protection of the rights of more than half
the population of Hong Kong.10
I. FROM COLONY TO SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION:
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Hong Kong’s status as a British colony since the mid-1800s
resulted in the application of English common law in Hong Kong,
subject to the need for modifications in light of local circumstances,
until June 30, 1997.11 Hong Kong also had its own legislature within
the first few years of British rule.12 Together, through the applica-
tion of local legislation, the principles of common law as developed
in England (subject to the modification for local circumstances test),
and any English statutes that were applicable by the Queen’s Order
in Council, this body of rules constituted the laws that would govern
Hong Kong in its ninety-nine years as a British colony.13
9. See discussion infra Part V.
10. According to the latest available statistics on the population of Hong Kong, as of
the middle of 2012, 3,818,100 out of a total population of 7,136,300 people were female.
This amounts to 53.5 %. Population—Overview, CENSUS & STATISTICS DEP’T: HKSAR,
http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
11. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, China-U.K., para. 4, Dec. 19, 1984, available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk
/en/issues/jd2.htm [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
12. History of the Legislature, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE HKSAR OF CHINA, http://
www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/intro/hist_lc.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
13. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 84 (H.K.); see Hong Kong Letters Patent 1917 to 1995,
app. I (1996), art. IX, available at http://www.law.hku.hk/conlawhk/sourcebook/10062.html.
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The Sino-British Joint Declaration (the Joint Declaration)14
set the terms for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong
Kong.15 The treaty provided that Hong Kong was to be constituted a
Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China
(China).16 Under this arrangement, although under Chinese sover-
eignty, the Hong Kong SAR was to be granted a high degree of auton-
omy, and, more importantly, the laws and economic systems previously
in force were to be retained, save where their continuation would be
inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty, in which case, they were to be
adapted where possible or otherwise repealed.17 Furthermore, Hong
Kong would be governed in accordance with its mini-constitution,
the Basic Law of Hong Kong (HKBL), which was promulgated in 1990
and came into effect on July 1, 1997, upon the establishment of the
Hong Kong SAR.18 In furtherance of the objectives underlined in the
Joint Declaration, the HKBL facilitates the continued application
of “laws previously in force,”19 guarantees judicial independence,20
and enables the SAR to enact its own laws, policies, and to develop
related jurisprudence in most areas of governance.21
The significance of this arrangement was that it facilitated the
smooth transfer of sovereignty to China whilst preserving the social,
political, legal, and economic order that had prevailed in the colony
for over one hundred years.22 This provided much needed confidence
in the future of Hong Kong’s continued stability as a region under the
sovereignty of China.23 In the lead-up to the transfer of sovereignty,
Hong Kong experienced a growth in its constitutional consciousness.
This growth corresponded with the establishment of the city’s first
Ombudsman’s office in the late 1980s,24 the enactment of the Hong
14. Joint Declaration, supra note 11, pmbl. This was an international treaty signed
between the United Kingdom and China in 1984 and deposited with the United Nations
Secretariat upon the exchange of instruments of ratification in June 1985. The Joint
Declaration, CONSTITUTIONAL & MAINLAND AFFAIRS BUREAU: HKSAR, http://www.cmab
.gov.hk/en/issues/joint2.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
15. Id. para. 1.
16. Id. para. 3(1).
17. See id. para. 3(2)–(3).
18. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA intro. and pmbl (H.K.).
19. See id. arts. 2, 8, 18, and 85.
20. Id. arts. 2, 19, 81, and 85.
21. Pursuant to articles 13, 14, 18, 19, 158, and Annex III of the HKBL, the Central
Authorities of China reserve powers with respect to matters of foreign affairs, defense
and acts of state, final interpretation of the HKBL, and affairs that are the responsibility
of the Central Authorities or matters pertaining to the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the Hong Kong SAR. Id. arts. 13, 14, 18, 19, 158, and Annex III.
22. See Joint Declaration, supra note 11, para. 5.
23. See id. pmbl.
24. The Ombudsman Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 397 (H.K.).
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Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance25 (HKBORO) in 1991, and the pro-
mulgation of the HKBL, which enshrined Hong Kong’s core inter-
national human rights commitments,26 followed by the introduction
of Hong Kong’s anti-discrimination laws, and the establishment of
the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in 1996,27 Hong Kong
was well positioned to ensure a smooth transition into the unique
constitutional experiment that characterized the one country, two
systems arrangement.28
In many respects, Hong Kong’s status as an international finan-
cial center and the modernization of the China’s economic system
and legal framework, it was hoped, would help guarantee the con-
tinuation of the constitutional guarantees and human rights pro-
tections put into place in the run-up to the transfer of sovereignty.29
Although these provisions have, with some exceptions, survived the
change of sovereignty,30 an analysis of the legal framework and ju-
risprudence suggests that these guarantees are very much in their
infancy and need to be complemented by a more robust monitoring
structure to achieve substantive equality for women.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS:
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AND THE GUARANTEES
OF EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
Hong Kong is bound by various international treaties, formerly
through the obligations of the United Kingdom, as a signatory to the
treaties concerned (which were specifically extended to apply to the
British Empire’s colonial territories), and presently as a result of the
provisions for the continuity of these obligations after the transfer
of sovereignty as provided for under the Joint Declaration.31 These
commitments have resulted in the enactment of various laws in Hong
Kong with a view towards fulfilling these international obligations.32
Apart from the obligation to enact relevant legislation and develop
supportive policy directives, state parties are required to report to the
relevant treaty bodies periodically.33 As part of the report, countries
25. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383.
26. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA arts. 25–42 (H.K.).
27. Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.).
28. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA arts. 1–2, 5 (H.K.).
29. See Joint Declaration, supra note 11, paras. 1, 3(1)–(2).
30. See discussion infra Parts IV–V.
31. See Joint Declaration, supra note 11, paras. 1, 3(1)–(2).
32. See discussion infra Part III.
33. Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Monitoring the Core International Human Rights
Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org
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are expected to provide an overview of treaty-related developments in
their country, highlight problem areas, and identify steps that have
been taken to address these gaps.34 Accordingly, Hong Kong files its
reports with the relevant treaty bodies periodically, synchronizing
its reports with the China’s reporting cycle since 1997.35 The treaty
bodies’ committees review country reports submitted by the govern-
ment, but also rely extensively on alternative and shadow reports
submitted by non-governmental organizations.36 These alternative
and shadow reports serve as a check against the country report.37
Upon reviewing all the submissions, the treaty bodies render “Con-
cluding Observations” on the country’s fulfilment of the obligations
under that treaty, commending good practices and highlighting areas
of concern.38 The reporting country is expected to report on measures
taken in response to the Concluding Observations in the subsequent
reporting cycle.39
Among the treaties that Hong Kong is bound by, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights40 (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS].
34. These obligations are set out in the CEDAW. Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 18, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. Similar provisions set out equivalent obligations
under other treaties. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 33.
35. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, SUBMISSION OF REPORTS BY THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION UNDER UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES,
PANEL ON HOME AFFAIRS, para. 1 (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk
/yr02-03/english/panels/ha/papers/ha1213cb2-588-2e.pdf.
36. A Note About Shadow Reports, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www
.stopvaw.org/a_note_about_shadow_reports (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
37. Shadow reports are those that follow after the non-governmental organization
has reviewed the government’s report to the treaty body. Shadow and Alternative Reports,
WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTRE, 3 (2008) http://www.wrc.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs
/2011/s/shadow_report_overview_feb_2010.pdf. Alternative reports, on the other hand,
are reports that are submitted when governments have not made their reports to the
treaty bodies publicly available. Id.
38. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 33.
39. The periodic reports to the treaty body serve an important function to ensure that
the government remains committed to the implementation and enforcement of interna-
tional human rights standards. Id. The increasing trend of submitting alternative and
shadow reports by non-governmental and other civil society organizations serves to bol-
ster the independence, transparency, and objectivity of the process. Carole J. Petersen
& Harriet Samuels, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: A Comparison of its Implementation and the Role of
Non-Governmental Organisations in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, 26 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 24 (2002). Concluding Observations are taken seriously given
their status as an international-level report card on the state’s performance. HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 33.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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(ICESCR) safeguard a range of civil and political rights including
the right to life, freedom of religion, speech and assembly, electoral
rights, the right to due process of law, economic, social and cultur-
al rights, including labor rights and rights to health, education, and
an adequate standard of living.41 These protections are available to
all individuals.42
Pursuant to the ICCPR, all persons are entitled to equal pro-
tection under the law without discrimination.43 Articles 2 and 3
guarantee the rights protected under the treaty to all persons with-
out distinction on any basis,44 and Article 3 specifically prohibits
gender-based discrimination.45 Article 26 further provides that dis-
crimination on any of the prohibited grounds: race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth, or other status is impermissible and requires legal prohibition
of, and equal and effective protection against, such discrimination.46
The ICESCR similarly protects individuals against such discrimina-
tion under Articles 2(2) and 3,47 the latter specifically calling for equal-
ity between men and women in the protection of economic, social, and
cultural rights set out in the ICESCR.48 Between them, these clauses
in both treaties serve to emphasize the importance of safeguarding,
not only the guarantee of equal protection, but also equal treatment
by prohibiting unlawful discrimination and recognizing the invidi-
ous impact of discrimination and its primary role in contributing to
unequal treatment.49
Hong Kong is also a party to numerous other international trea-
ties that have been adopted with a view to protecting specific groups
of people and the rights and interests of people in particular circum-
stances. For example, the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination50 (ICERD), CEDAW,51 the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
41. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
42. ICCPR, supra note 40, arts. 1, 5–11, 13, and 15; ICESCR, supra note 41, arts. 1–3,
6, 9, 12, 14, 16–19, 21–22, and 25.
43. ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 26.
44. Id. arts. 2–3.
45. Id. art. 3.
46. Id. art. 26.
47. ICESCR, supra note 41, arts. 2(2), 3.
48. Id. art. 3.
49. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, 37th
Sess., para. 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add 1/Rev 1 (Nov. 10, 1989).
50. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
51. CEDAW, supra note 34.
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Treatment or Punishment52 (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of
the Child53 (CRC), the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families54
(ICRMW), and more recently, the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance55 (CPED) and
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities56 (CRPD).
Pursuant to its obligations under these treaties, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment is required to protect individuals and groups at risk through
appropriate policies and legislation.57
Despite the existence of these international human rights trea-
ties and parallel national legislation which provides for the equal
protection of the human rights of all individuals irrespective of sex,58
in practice, women face numerous barriers to the realization of their
human rights as a result of discrimination and unequal treatment.59
For example, some countries exclude women from participating in
the political system (the right to vote or run for public office), access
to education, justice, employment, and even prohibit their inheritance
of family wealth and assets.60 Women may also face circumstantial
barriers to full and equal participation in society. For example, vio-
lence against women, the lack of adequate access to healthcare or
child support, and barriers to certain types of employment or unequal
pay for equal work are all factors that negatively impact women’s
prospects for their equal enjoyment of rights.61 In these circum-
stances, countries around the world have recognized the need for
specific protections that focus on the needs of women as a group and
52. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
53. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
54. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 92.
55. G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007).
56. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30,
2007, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 50–54.
58. Women’s right to equality is guaranteed under the ICCPR and ICESCR under
Article 2 of both treaties, committing states to ensuring the equal right to the enjoyment
of all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and non-discrimination on grounds
of sex, among other things. ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 2. Article 7 of the ICESCR specif-
ically recognizes the right of women workers to be guaranteed conditions of work not infe-
rior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work. ICESCR, supra note 41, art. 7.
59. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 34, art. 15.
60.  UN WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 8 (2011),
available at http://progress.unwomen.org/pdfs/EN-Report-Progress.pdf.
61. James Crabtree, UN: Barriers to Gender Equality Remain, FIN. TIMES (July 6,
2011, 6:52 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/649bd546-a6f1-11e0-a808-00144feabda0.html
#axzz27yzhVS1J.
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how their rights to non-discrimination and equal protection can be
effectively realized.62
Of the various international treaties listed above, most relevant
to the protection of the rights of women is the CEDAW, which is one
of the most widely ratified international conventions.63 As the pre-
amble to the CEDAW notes, despite the equal protection rights guar-
anteed under the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, “extensive discrimination against women contin-
ues to exist” 64 and “violates the principles of equality of rights and
respect for human dignity.” 65 The preamble recognizes that discrim-
ination against women impedes the ability of women to participate
fully and on equal terms with men in political, social, economic, and
cultural life, hampering prosperity of the family and the society as
a whole.66 Furthermore, it emphasizes the need to develop women’s
capacities and potential for equal and maximum participation in
the service of humanity in order to secure development, welfare, and
peace for countries.67 Finally, it singles out the historical lack of rec-
ognition of women’s contribution to the welfare of families and so-
cieties and the need for a change in the traditional role of women
and men in the family and society in order to facilitate full equality
between men and women.68 The central objective of the CEDAW is:
the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women on
the basis of sex. It guarantees women the equal recognition, enjoy-
ment and exercise of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, domestic
or any other field, irrespective of their marital status, and on a
basis of equality with men.69
62. CEDAW, U. N. TREATY DATABASE, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) [herein-
after U. N. TREATY DATABASE].
63. As of September 2012, the CEDAW has been ratified by 187 states. See id. Although
the CEDAW was ratified by the United Kingdom in 1985, its application was not ex-
tended to Hong Kong until 1996. Id. In 1997, upon the transfer of sovereignty, the Chinese
government took over the reporting and implementations of CEDAW-related obligations
for Hong Kong. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, supra note 35, para. 3. It also notified
the Secretary General of the extension of reservations made by the China to its own obli-
gations under the said treaty, to Hong Kong. U.N. TREATY DATABASE, supra note 62.
64. CEDAW, supra note 34, pmbl.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. These views were echoed in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
which was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Fourth World
Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
para. 124(f), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20, A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Sept. 15, 1995).
69. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recom-
mendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the CEDAW,
Oct. 4–Oct. 22, 2010, para. 4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, 47th Sess. (Oct. 19, 2010).
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The implementation of the CEDAW by state parties is overseen by the
CEDAW Committee, which is established pursuant to Article 17 of
the CEDAW Convention.70
However, given that specific individuals and groups have been
internationally recognized as being particularly vulnerable and at
risk, leading to a proliferation of treaties to protect them, these other
treaties are equally significant to address the impact of the circum-
stances they find themselves in which tend to have a compounded ef-
fect on women.71 Their situation is exacerbated by the multiple layers
of discrimination they experience when inequalities in a range of
spheres intersect.72 For present purposes however, it is sufficient to
note the array of international obligations that are binding on Hong
Kong, which make it incumbent on personnel involved in the devel-
opment of law, policy, and jurisprudence to incorporate international
standards into these processes to enhance the quality of protection
for women, particularly given the multiple inequalities women ex-
perience as a group because women as a gendered group are often
implicated in numerous other marginalized “groupings.” The lack of
an intersectional approach to tackle multiple fronts of discrimina-
tion and inequality severely undercuts the effectiveness of human
rights protections for women.
III. THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND THE
GUARANTEES OF EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
International obligations require the implementation of treaty
provisions, usually through the enactment of local legislation. Hong
Kong protects a range of human rights through provisions in the
HKBL,73 the HKBORO,74 and various anti-discrimination laws.75
Pursuant to these laws, it has become possible to hold government,
and in some instances private actors, accountable for a violation of
these rights.76 However, apart from the inadequacies inherent in
some of the implementing legislation, the supporting machinery
70. The CEDAW Committee comprises twenty-three experts from a range of countries,
the representatives serve the Committee on a rotational basis, serving two-year terms.
CEDAW, supra note 34, art. 17(1)–(5).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50–54.
72. At the Crossroads of Gender and Racial Discrimination, WORLD CONFERENCE
AGAINST RACISM, http://www.un.org/WCAR/e-kit/gender.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
73. XIANGGANG JIBAN FA arts. 24–42 (H.K.).
74. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383.
75. See, e.g., Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.).
76. See, e.g., id. §§ 17–18.
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that enables the legal enforcement of these rights leaves much to
be desired. To this end, the reporting obligations force a degree of
self-scrutiny and reflection and are most useful in prompting change
(given the international nature of any commendation or censure) be-
fore the next reporting cycle.77 The level of scrutiny the government
is subject to under the international reporting process is, however,
ultimately dependent on the collective efforts of NGOs, human rights
groups, and their lobbying efforts directed at the CEDAW committee,
all of which provide opportunities to expose the failings of the Hong
Kong machinery.78
The legal framework for the protection of the fundamental rights
of equality and non-discrimination in Hong Kong is modeled after
international human rights treaties.79 Article 25 of the HKBL pro-
vides that “[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law,”80
and any legislation contravening this provision is unlawful.81 These
rights have been further entrenched through Article 39 of the HKBL,
which incorporates the provisions of the ICCPR, the ICESCR, as well
as international labor conventions82 that were applicable to Hong
Kong prior to 1997, into Hong Kong’s constitutional framework.83
Article 39, paragraph 2 provides that these freedoms shall not be
restricted unless prescribed by law and that such restrictions are
themselves to be in accordance with said international treaties.84 The
equality and non-discrimination guarantees in these instruments
are, therefore, directly co-opted into the constitution to supplement
the right to equality under Article 25 of the HKBL, which itself is
notably brief, and the numerous human rights protections that are
enshrined in the HKBL and other local legislation.85 Moreover, any
laws that contravene either Article 25 or Article 39 of the HKBL
would be deemed unconstitutional and, as a result of the powers of
77. See supra text accompanying notes 35–39.
78. See discussion infra Part III.
79. For a comprehensive overview of the constitutional right to equality, its concep-
tualization and development through the courts’ jurisprudence, see Kelley Loper, The Right
to Equality and Non-Discrimination, in THE LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION (2011).
80. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 25 (H.K.).
81. Article 11 of the HKBL prohibits the enactment of any legislation that contra-
venes the HKBL. Id. art. 11.
82. For an overview of the various labor conventions that are applicable to Hong Kong
and their implications on the rights of women in the labor market, see Rick Glofcheski &
Ho Yan Leung, Job Security and Entitlements within Hong Kong’s Maternity Protection
Legislation, 25 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 327, 329 (2009).
83. HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 442, 455B (C.F.A.).
84. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 39 (H.K.).
85. Id. arts. 25–41.
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judicial review and the doctrine of separation of powers, may be struck
down as such by the Hong Kong courts in appropriate circumstances.86
These constitutional and international guarantees are imple-
mented through a range of enactments. The HKBORO, for example,
provides that men and women shall have equal enjoyment of all civil
and political rights set forth in the HKBORO87 and shall enjoy equal
protection before the law.88 It also specifically protects the right to
equality and non-discrimination and replicates the list of prohibited
grounds of discrimination in the ICCPR. The HKBORO binds the
government, all public authorities, and any person acting on behalf
of the government or a public authority.89 Protection against dis-
crimination on grounds of sex is further elaborated in two anti-
discrimination statutes. The Sex Discrimination Ordinance90 (SDO)
ensures that women are not prejudiced against because of their gen-
der in a range of contexts including: employment, the provision of
goods and services, housing, voting, standing for elections, and the de-
velopment and implementation of government policy.91 The Family
Status Discrimination Ordinance92 (FSDO) prohibits discrimination
against a person on the grounds that they have responsibilities in-
volving the care of a family member.93 These two statutes apply to
the government and the private sector.94
Given the overlapping but differentiated applicability of this
scheme of provisions that seek to protect women against inequality
and discrimination, the importance of court-related jurisprudence
in the elaboration of the nature and extent of the right to equality
and its relationship with the principle of non-discrimination cannot
be overstated. Protection against discrimination has been recognized
as an essential counterpart to securing the right to equality.95 The
86. For a detailed overview of the circumstances in which Hong Kong courts may legi-
timately exercise such powers of judicial review, see Puja Kapai, A Principled Approach To-
wards Judicial Review: Lessons from Wv. Registrar of Marriages, 41 H.K.L.J. 49, 67 (2011).
87. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383, § 3, art. 1 (replicating ICCPR,
supra note 40, art. 2(1), 3).
88. Id. at 8, § 8, art. 22 (replicating ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 26).
89. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance at 2, § 7.
90. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480 (H.K.).
91. Id.
92. Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 527 (H.K.).
93. Id. at 1, pmbl.
94. See Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 4, §§ 3, 5; Family Status Discrimination
Ordinance at 3, § 3, 5.
95. For a detailed discussion of the development of equality law and related jurispru-
dence in Hong Kong in the early years of Hong Kong’s anti-discrimination laws, see
Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right: The Development of Anti-Discrimination
Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 335, 335 (1996). See also Discrimination
Law, in EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE IN HONG KONG (Rick Glofcheski et al. eds., 2010)
[hereinafter EMPLOYMENT LAW]; Carole J. Petersen, Implementing Equality: An Analysis
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next section details some of the salient provisions of the SDO, the
FSDO, and discusses the mechanisms that the anti-discrimination
laws put into place to deal with violations of these rights.
A. Sex Discrimination Ordinance
The SDO was enacted in 1995 and came into force in 1996.96 It
aims to protect people in Hong Kong against discrimination on the
basis of sex, marital status, pregnancy, and against sexual harass-
ment.97 Sections 4, 7, and 8 of the SDO prohibit both direct and in-
direct forms of discrimination.98 Where the cause for the treatment
can be attributed directly to one of the prohibited grounds of sex,
marital status, or pregnancy, this constitutes direct discrimination.99
Thus, where a person is treated less favorably than a person of the
opposite sex, a different marital status, or a person who is not preg-
nant, this constitutes direct discrimination.100 Where a neutral re-
quirement or condition is imposed which has the effect that a person
falling within a prohibited category of discrimination would be less
likely to be able to meet that condition,101 that condition cannot be
justified regardless of the sex of the party concerned, and its appli-
cation would have a detrimental impact on a person in the position
of the party concerned, it would constitute indirect discrimination.102
Moreover, the SDO protects women against sexual harassment
in the workplace.103 “Sexual harassment” covers a range of behaviors
including: unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
unwelcome conduct that is sexual in nature and would be perceived
of Two Recent Decisions Under Hong Kong’s Anti-Discrimination Laws, 29 H.K.L.J. 178,
178 (1999); Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong’s First Anti-Discrimination Laws and Their
Potential Impact on the Employment Market, 27 H.K.L.J. 324, 325–26 (1997).
96. EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 95, at 305.
97. Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 1, pmbl.
98. Id. at 4, §§ 4–5, §§ 7–8.
99. Petersen, Hong Kong’s First Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 95, at 335–36.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 337; see also EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 95, at 325.
102. See Petersen, Hong Kong’s First Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 95, at 337;
see also EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 95, at 325.
103. Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 2, § 2. This section is to be read expansively so
as to include hostility created in learning environments. See Yuen Sha Sha v. Tse Chi
Pan, [1999] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 28, 28P–29A (D.C.). This is one of the first sexual harassment
cases brought under the SDO by a female student at the Chinese University of Hong Kong
whose roommate’s boyfriend had installed a hidden camcorder in her bedroom aimed to
capture images near her dressing area. The liability for sexual harassment was consti-
tuted on the basis of invasion of the privacy of the student. As various commentators have
noted, however, the decision also represents the difficulties victims of harassment, unequal
treatment, and discrimination face in seeking to implement their rights through litiga-
tion, which can be a stressful, lengthy, and expensive process. See Petersen, Implementing
Equality, supra note 95, at 188.
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as such by a reasonable bystander, with regard to all the circum-
stances, leading her likely to conclude that the person at the receiving
end of the behavior would be offended, humiliated, or intimidated.104
The section also provides that a person, either acting alone or together
with others, may create a hostile or intimidating working environ-
ment for another by engaging in conduct that is sexual in nature.105
Section 9 of the SDO foresees the possibility that victims of sex-
ual harassment or discrimination may face retaliation for lodging a
complaint and therefore provides that where a person is victimized
as a result of filing a claim under the SDO against a party, that
would also constitute discrimination.106
Whilst the SDO sets out the “actionable grounds” with respect
to various activities and organizations, some sections specifically
exempt certain entities from the application of provisions. For ex-
ample, sections 21 and 38 exempt the government from actionable
unlawful discrimination where the acts done are pursuant to immi-
gration legislation pertaining to entry into, stay in, or departure from
Hong Kong.107 These exemptions have been the subject of extensive
criticism both locally, by non-governmental organizations, and also
at the CEDAW Committee level.108 This is particularly so given the
government’s reliance on the provisions and the relevant CEDAW
reservation in defense of the two week rule that is imposed on for-
eign domestic helpers who are required to leave the territory within
two weeks of the termination of their contract.109 In these circum-
stances, many helpers are left vulnerable in the event that they
have claims to pursue against employers for outstanding debts, sex-
ual or physical abuse, or if they wish to find another employer to
continue working in Hong Kong.110
104. Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 2, § 2(5)(a).
105. Id. at 2, § 2(5)(b).
106. Id. at 5–6, § 9.
107. Id. at 12, §§ 21(2), and 38(2). This is consistent with a reservation entered by the
Chinese Government in a communication on the question of Hong Kong deposited with
the Secretary-General, dated June 20, 1997. See Historical Information on CEDAW, U.N.
TREATY DATABASE, China note 2, http://treaties.un.org/pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?#“China”
(last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
108. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding
Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Aug. 7–
Aug. 25, 2006, paras. 41–42, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHC/CO/6, 36th Sess. (Aug. 25, 2006)
[hereinafter Concluding Comments].
109. Id.
110. This is seen as gender-based discrimination due to the invidious impact of this rule
on foreign domestic helpers as a group who are predominantly, if not exclusively, women.
See Petersen, Equality as a Human Right, supra note 95, at 348. The rule has also been
criticized for its role in creating an impediment to due process rights and access to justice
given that many women have been forced to abandon their claims as a result of not being
allowed to continue working in Hong Kong pending the outcome of these claims as the
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More recently, this reservation came into play in the govern-
ment’s defense of an immigration exception that specifically singles
out foreign domestic helpers as being unentitled to counting their
period of stay in Hong Kong towards the seven years of continuous
residence requirement that is one of the conditions precedent to
acquiring permanent resident status and the right of abode in Hong
Kong.111 The exclusion of their time spent in Hong Kong as domestic
helpers towards the calculation of the seven year period singles out
this group of women compared to others who have similarly entered
Hong Kong on employment but are entitled to count their stay in
Hong Kong during this time towards the calculation of their period
of continuous residence in Hong Kong.112
Among other exceptions in the SDO, § 22 notably confers an
exception to religious bodies where the preference for a person of a
particular sex for certain duties is based in religious doctrine.113 This
comports with the list of reservations made by the PRC Government
at the time it lodged its acceptance of CEDAW-related obligations
with respect to Hong Kong.114
Also of particular interest is § 35, which secures the equal right
of women to be eligible to stand for and vote in elections in any ad-
visory body, defined to include a public body, public authority, a stat-
utory advisory body, a prescribed body,115 and for relevant positions,
including that of village representative or office-holder of a Rural
Committee, as defined in the Heung Yee Kuk Ordinance.116 Despite
this seemingly progressive stance against the entrenchment of cul-
tural and indigenous practices pertaining to the rights of women, in
practice, women do not have equal standing in such elections given
the importance of the selection of heads of household, a process
which invariably tends to be male-dominated in determining the
pool of candidates for selection as village representatives, which, in
turn, affects their eligibility to serve as Rural Committee members
employment contract under which they would have entered Hong Kong would likely
have terminated or be the subject of the claim before the courts. See Submission to the
Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), ASIAN
MIGRANTS COORDINATING BODY— HONG KONG & MISSION FOR MIGRANT WORKERS, § 1(a)
(2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/MFMW_China
_75.doc [hereinafter Submission to the CERD]. This makes justice against their violators
too expensive an ordeal for them and imposes an exorbitant opportunity cost, one which
many of them cannot afford given their impoverished backgrounds. See id. § 1(b).
111. See Submission to the CERD, supra note 110, at § 1(c).
112. See Vallejos Evangeline Banao v. Comm’r of Registration, [2012] H.K.E.C. 433,
paras. 2, 3(3) (C.A.) (H.K.).
113. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, 12, § 22 (H.K.).
114. U.N. TREATY DATABASE, supra note 62, n.14.
115. Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 17, § 35(1).
116. Id.
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(who are selected from village representatives).117 Thus, the process
of determining heads of households is one which ought to be checked
for discrimination, as opposed to the broader level elections. This is
particularly important where the designation as head of household
carries with it significant legal and political powers.118 Alterna-
tively, instead of a system in which households elect village repre-
sentatives (through their head), individuals should be given the
right to vote for village representatives.
However, despite the availability of legal protection against sex-
based discrimination, women continue to face opposition and intimi-
dation in the exercise of their rights to fully participate in public life
in the New Territories.119 This is despite related exemptions in the
SDO, for example, § 61, which provides that nothing in the SDO af-
fects the terms of the New Territories Ordinance120 (NTO), the New
Territories Leases (Extension) Ordinance121 (NTLEO), or renders un-
lawful any act done pursuant to those ordinances.122 Although it used
to be the case that women were prohibited from inheriting land in
117. See Petersen, Equality as a Human Right, supra note 95, at 344. Although the case
of Sec’y for Justice v. Chan Wah, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 459 (C.F.A.) (H.K.), applied this
provision, the factual matrix concerned discrimination against non-indigenous residents
in the village as opposed to a gender-based preference that emanated from religious doc-
trine as the reservation requires. See id. at 459G–61C. Indeed, it can be argued that this
is precisely the kind of gender-based discrimination rooted in cultural practices that
CEDAW was designed to help get state parties past.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Few Women Take Part in Elections, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 2011, http://
www.scmp.com/article/740029/few-women-take-part-elections (lamenting that only 2.23
percent of candidates in the 2011 village elections were women and a meager 0.79 per-
cent of candidates were women in indigenous representative elections).
120. New Territories Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 97 (H.K.).
121. New Territories Leases (Extension) Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 150 (H.K.).
122. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, § 61(b) (H.K.). A question that
arises is whether Article 40 of the HKBL resurrects the exclusive male succession right
which was challenged and resulted in the passage of the exemptions in the NTO and the
NTLEO. Article 40 preserves the lawful and traditional rights of indigenous inhabitants
of the New Territories. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 40 (H.K.). Insofar as it protects the inter-
ests of male indigenous inhabitants as a matter of tradition, it is arguable that such rights
have been inadvertently “restored” to the extent that these were diminished by the passage
of any earlier ordinances. See LISA HOPKINSON & MANDY LAO MAN LEI, CIVIC EXCHANGE,
RETHINKING THE SMALL HOUSE POLICY 31 (2003). However, the counter-argument to this
position would be that Article 40 only protects the “lawful” rights and to the extent that the
rights asserted by male indigenous inhabitants are discriminatory against female indige-
nous inhabitants, they cannot be lawful rights. See, e.g., CHRISTINE LOH, CIVIC EXCHANGE,
INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN OF THE NEW TERRITORIES 4–5, 8–9 (2004).
However, see Johannes Chan, Rights of the Indigenous Inhabitants of the New Territories,
in THE LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION (2011), where he argues that since the pro-
tection of such traditional rights entail their exclusivity to male indigenous inhabitants
and as such, cannot be attacked on grounds of gender equality to diminish such rights
whether by relying on the equality provision. See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 25; Sex
Discrimination Ordinance at 26, § 61.
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Hong Kong, purportedly as a result of Chinese customary law, this
prohibition was lifted in 1994.123 Despite this change, however, the
Small House Policy extended by the government in 1972, under which
it offered free building licenses or government land at a discounted
premium to male indigenous inhabitants descended from indigenous
male lineage of a recognized village in 1898,124 remains firmly intact
today despite the discrimination inherent in such a policy insofar as
it works to enrich indigenous men so defined as opposed to indige-
nous women in such clans, and to the extent that it discriminates
against non-indigenous peoples.125
Section 13 of the NTO empowers courts to recognize and enforce
any Chinese custom or customary right affecting land in the New
Territories.126 Moreover, the HKBL, through Article 40, has effec-
tively entrenched the rights of male indigenous inhabitants.127 This
represents a significant and missed opportunity to rectify outdated
practices and strike an appropriate balance between the preserva-
tion of cultural practices and the need for their reconciliation with
modern constitutional principles such as gender equality. The cir-
cumstances that might have justified some of these policies in 1898
(after the British invasion) certainly warrant review in an era when
property is at a premium in Hong Kong,128 and any such discount
offered to particular groups on the basis of their lineage and gender
should certainly raise grave doubts about the government’s commit-
ment to equality.
These circumstances are unfortunate and underscore the con-
tinued influence of the Heung Yee Kuk, originally recognized by the
colonial government to represent the interests of the indigenous in-
habitants of the New Territories.129 It is arguable, however, that their
original function has largely been dispensed with and they now re-
main warlords of power in their individual fiefdoms, eager to hold
123. See Sally Engle Merry & Rachel E. Stern, The Female Inheritance Movement in
Hong Kong: Theorizing the Local/Global Interface, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 387, 387
(2005); see also Petersen, Equality as a Human Right, supra note 95, at 355–56 (provid-
ing a comprehensive treatment of the customary practice and the run-up to its legislative
repeal); Harriet Samuels, Hong Kong on Women, Asian Values and the Law, 21 HUM. RTS.
Q. 707, 720–24 (1999).
124. Merry & Stern, supra note 123, at 401.
125. For an elaboration of this policy, see DIRECTOR OF AUDIT, AUDIT COMM’N: HKSAR,
REPORT OF AUDIT COMM’N NO. 39 Ch. 8 (2002). It is also pertinent to note the CEDAW
Committee’s call that the Hong Kong Government repeal discriminatory provisions of
the Small House Policy and ensure that indigenous women have the same rights and
access to property as indigenous men. See Concluding Comments, supra note 108, para. 38.
126. New Territories Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 97, 3, § 13(1) (H.K.).
127. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 40 (H.K.).
128. See Merry & Stern, supra note 123, at 401.
129. See Heung Yee Kuk Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 1097 (H.K.).
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on to their privileges in times and circumstances that no longer jus-
tify their position.130 In fact, the Heung Yee Kuk remains a male-
dominated consultative body, which ought to be democratized in
view of the power the committee wields over the interests of women
and the special privileges they enjoy over those entitled to ordinary
non-indigenous residents. The shifting demographic and social cir-
cumstances in light of the urbanization of the New Territories have
narrowed the gap between those with indigenous lineage, and the
common Chinese population in Hong Kong.131 However, the contin-
ued protection of the rights of indigenous inhabitants under Article
40 of the HKBL represents an almost insurmountable challenge in
light of its entrenchment of “traditional rights and interests.”132
Article 40 of the HKBL provides that “[t]he lawful traditional rights
and interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New Territories’
shall be protected by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”133
Arguably, it could be said that the entrenchment of any policies, tra-
ditions, rights, or interests that contravene the equality guarantee is
itself unlawful and thereby not protected by this provision.134 How-
ever, such a watered-down reading would be perceived as a threat
by the Heung Yee Kuk and would be strongly contested if the Small
House Policy or other discriminatory policies persisting in Hong Kong
were to be challenged in court for their constitutionality.135
On the whole, the anti-discrimination legislation in Hong Kong
reflects a fairly formal approach to the concept of equality. A version
of equality that is substantive or transformative136 such that it would
serve to eliminate the impact of past discrimination and build ca-
pacities to empower prejudiced individuals to militate against past
setbacks remains a distant goal for local advocates of equality.137
The SDO does, however, provide that voluntary temporary special
130. See Merry & Stern, supra note 123, at 394, 398, 401.
131. See id. at 396.
132. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 40 (H.K.).
133. Id.
134. For a detailed exposition of this argument, see Chan, supra note 122.
135. For an overview of the rights of indigenous people in Hong Kong, see id.
136. Sandra Fredman has written extensively about the distinction between the for-
mal, substantive, and transformative approaches to equality and the significant and mean-
ingful changes that can be brought about through government commitment to visions of
transformative equality in its framework laws for equal protection and non-discrimination.
See Sandra Fredman, Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards
a New Definition of Equal Rights, in TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE
FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE 4(1) 111 (Ineke Boerefijin et al. eds., 2003).
137. See Sandile Ngcobo, The Meaning of Article 4(1) of the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A South African Perspective,
in TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER
ARTICLE 4(1) 181, 202 (Ineke Boerefijin et al. eds., 2003).
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measures such as affirmative action policies or other special measures
“reasonably intended” to allow equal access to traditionally marginal-
ized groups, are permissible as part of the aims of anti-discrimination
law.138 Unfortunately, this is not a requirement and thus, does not im-
pose any obligations on the government or other relevant institutions
to adopt such measures necessary to achieve substantive equality in
the representation of women in different spheres, whether in employ-
ment, government services, or traditionally male-dominated fields.139
The lack of “bite” or the negligible educational value of this section
is notable in light of the fact that neither the government nor any
other industry or institution in Hong Kong has thus far implemen-
ted any such measures.140 This reaffirms the view that the govern-
ment is generally loathe to upset the business sector by introducing
138. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, 21, § 48 (H.K.). It is noteworthy
that no equivalent provision appears in the Race Discrimination Ordinance (or the Dis-
ability Discrimination Ordinance for that matter), despite the fact that the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s (CERD) deliberations played a major role
in the development and application of this principle as part of the CEDAW. See Race
Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.); see also Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special
Measures in the ICERD, Aug. 3–Aug. 28, 2009, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, 75th Sess.
(Sept. 24, 2009) (describing the CERD’s deliberations on recommending special measures).
139. Carole J. Petersen, Stuck on Formalities? A Critique of Hong Kong’s Legal Frame-
work for Gender Equality, in MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN HONG KONG SOCIETY (Fanny
M. Cheung & Eleanor Holroyd eds., 2009) 401, 419.
140. Shockingly, the one instance in which the government has adopted a “special mea-
sure” is with respect to advancing the position of boys by computing their results in the
Secondary School Placement Allocation system in Hong Kong in a manner that boosts
the results of the top 30% of boys in order to equalize their numbers with girls, who were
performing better than boys on average. See Equal Opportunity Comm’n v. Dir. of Educ.,
[2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 690, 738F (C.F.I.) (H.K.). Overall, the policy worked to the severe
detriment of girls, who, although performing better than the boys, would not be placed in
an elite school, the placement to which they would have been entitled, had it not been for
the government’s application of this special measure which enabled boys with lower re-
sults to secure placement at elite secondary schools. See id. at 713H–14G. This system be-
came the subject of a judicial review application, initiated by the EOC in the Hong Kong
courts and eventually, led to the striking down of this practice in view of its discrimina-
tory impact on girls. See id. at 692B, 742H. Surprisingly, despite the government’s gen-
eral stance against affirmative action of any kind, the government defended the policy as
a necessary, temporary measure in order to ensure that girls did not obtain a majority of
the places in the highly coveted elite schools. Id. at 711F. The argument was that the mea-
sure was necessary to achieve equality between girls and boys and therefore, was permit-
ted by § 48 of the SDO. Id. at 691E. However, this argument failed due to the fact that
temporary measures are supposed to be temporary, and the policy had been (secretly) in
place for almost twenty years. See id. at 732A. See also Andrew Byrnes, The Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in The UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (P. Alston ed., 2nd ed., 1999) (arguing that the court could
have rejected the special measures defense on grounds that it was designed to advance the
interests of women in order to address historical discriminatory practices against them as
a group, and as such the provision could not be used to safeguard the interests of men).
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law or policy that would interfere with the free market or laissez-
faire approach.141
A further area of concern is the lack of appropriate recourse for
sexual minorities such as members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender community who often face discrimination on the
grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity. There have
been some successful challenges brought before the courts drawing
on equality and non-discrimination provisions in the HKBL and
HKBORO142 on grounds of sexual orientation discrimination, how-
ever. These cases were successful and led to the repeal of legislation
that was discriminatory given its detrimental impact against the
group concerned.143 A successful claim against a private actor has yet
to be made to determine whether discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation can be covered by the term “sex” in the SDO.144 However,
141. See Petersen, supra note 139, at 418 (noting that the government’s resistance to
quotas or affirmative action is premised on the conflict between such measures and the
ideals of a free market economy and a meritocratic system).
142. Despite the lack of an explicit category prohibiting discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation, the claimants were able to successfully argue that the phrase “sex” or
“other status” reasonably covered discrimination against persons of different sexual ori-
entation as a group. See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335,
346 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). The argument has yet to be tested for its applicability to persons alleg-
ing discriminatory treatment on the basis of gender identity. See, e.g., Robyn Emerton,
Time for Change: A Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual and Other Transgender
Persons in Hong Kong, 34 H.K.L.J. 515, 519 (2004). At present, a transgender person would
need to establish that they suffer from gender identity disorder, which would bring them
within the prohibited ground of discrimination based on “mental disorder” and therefore,
that they had been unlawfully discriminated against under the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance. Id. at 542–43 (citing Disability Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 487,
1, § 2 (H.K.)). However, it should be noted that the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ECOSOC), has defined “sex” to include “physiological characteristics”
and “the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles.” See
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination
in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, May 4–May 22, 2009, para. 20, ESCOR, U.N.
Doc. E/C12/GV/20, 42nd Sess. (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter ECOSOC]. The category “other
status” has likewise been recognized to include “sexual orientation” for the purposes of
Article 22 of the HKBORO by the Court of Final Appeal in Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk
Lung, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, 346D (C.F.A.) (H.K.). This category has been broadly
construed to include multiple discrimination, age, marital and family status and sexual
orientation and gender identity, among other things. See ECOSOC, supra note 142, 174,
para. 27. The Human Rights Committee (which oversees state implementation of the
ICCPR) and ECOSOC have also repeated calls for Hong Kong to implement relevant anti-
discrimination law to guard against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.
143. See Leung v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211, 239C–40H (C.A.) (H.K.)
(setting the age of consent at 16 for both heterosexual and homosexual intercourse, deem-
ing all government-sponsored discrimination based on sexual orientation to be unconsti-
tutional, interpreting Articles 1 and 22 of the HKBORO to include sexual orientation).
144. On Hong Kong’s public movement towards the development of protections for the
LGBT community and its brush with faces of extreme conservatism within the commu-
nity in the context of domestic violence protection for lesbian and gay couples, see Puja
Kapai, The Same Difference: Protecting Same-Sex Couples Under the Domestic Violence
2013] THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN HONG KONG 275
in light of the successes of the constitutional challenges raising sim-
ilar arguments concerning the breadth of this category at appellate
level courts, it is only a matter of time before the right case presents
itself before the courts for an explicit determination of this issue.
B. Family Status Discrimination Ordinance
The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance145 (FSDO) is an-
other important statute enacted in 1997 in recognition of the discrim-
ination that people, predominantly women146 who are responsible for
the care of immediate family members, routinely face, and to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of “family status.”147 This prohibition cov-
ers direct and indirect forms of discrimination148 against persons with
family status and recognizes a range of family relationships.149 Like
the SDO, there is a provision to protect victims against retaliation
for filing a complaint or taking legal action.150 However, the juris-
prudence relating to the FSDO is underdeveloped insofar as the full
ambit of the protections are concerned, particularly in instances
where a suitable comparator is required, in order to arrive at a de-
termination of the grounds for discrimination.151
C. Race Discrimination Ordinance
The Race Discrimination Ordinance152 (RDO) was enacted in
July 2008 and came into force in July 2009.153 The RDO makes it
Ordinance, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 7 (2009). See also Carole J. Petersen, Values in Transition:
The Development of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement in Hong Kong, 19 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337 (1997).
145. Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 527 (H.K.).
146. A recent survey on public attitudes towards gender issues revealed that almost
80% of the respondents cited gender-based prejudice regarding the roles and abilities of
women, their responsibilities for taking care of children, and the prevalence of sex dis-
crimination and gender inequality in society as the three primary reasons that women in
Hong Kong fail to realize their full potential. See LABOUR AND WELFARE BUREAU: HKSAR,
WOMEN’S COMMISSION: FINDINGS OF SURVEY ON COMMUNITY PERCEPTION ON GENDER
ISSUES 5 (2009), available at http://www.lwb.gov.hk/eng/press/resulte.pdf.
147. See Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 527 (H.K.).
148. Id. at 3, § 5.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3–4, § 6.
151. See Johannes Chan, Comparators in Marital Status Discrimination: General or
Specific, 40 H.K.L.J. 563, 563 (2010).
152. Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.).
153. The circumstances surrounding the passage of the RDO are unprecedented con-
sidering the heavily politicized discourse surrounding the need for such legislation in Hong
Kong, societal attitudes towards the problematization of racial discrimination, and the
heavily contested nature of the scope and content of the law. Sunny Chiang, Will the Race
Discrimination Ordinance Eliminate Race Discrimination in Hong Kong?, LEXISNEXIS,
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unlawful to discriminate, harass, or vilify a person on the ground of
race.154 “Race” is defined as a person’s race, color, descent, or national
or ethnic origin.155 The ordinance covers not only acts of discrimina-
tion that are motivated by the victim’s race, but also acts based on
the race of a near relative of the victim.156 As with the other anti-
discrimination legislation in Hong Kong, direct and indirect discrim-
ination are covered by the RDO.157 Significantly, the RDO also renders
unlawful conduct constituting victimization on the grounds of a com-
plaint being lodged by the victim158 or harassment based on the
victim’s or a close relative’s race.159 Harassment as defined includes
unwelcome words or conduct which would cause a reasonable person
in the circumstances to feel offense, humiliation, or intimidation.160
Likewise, conduct or words that create an intimidating or hostile
work environment for the victim will constitute racial discrimina-
tion and even a single incident would suffice if the elements of the
offence are met.161
Section 45 replicates a provision in the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance,162 prohibiting any act designed to incite hatred towards,
Sept. 4, 2008, https://law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/hk/Hong-Kong-Lawyer-/Will-the-Race
-Discrimination-Ordinance-Eliminate-Race-Discrimination-in-Hong-Kong. Although ini-
tially resisted by the government with a view toward guarding business and corporate
interests, when the sentiment of this constituency changed in light of increasingly com-
petitive Asian market economies which were attracting talented labor on account of better
protection for minority groups, the government yielded to calls for the introduction of this
law. Carole J. Petersen, International Norms and Domestic Law Reform: The Difficult
Birth of Hong Kong’s Racial Discrimination Law, 6 DIRECTIONS 13, 18. However, as numer-
ous scholars have noted, the version of the law proposed, the prolonged and antagonized
public and legislative discussion on various provisions, and the law in its enacted form,
are depictive of the stronghold of corporate power in Hong Kong, the government’s open
servitude to such interests, and the self-serving nature of the law given its exemption of
government acts conducted in any capacity other than “as a private person.” Kelley Loper,
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Dilemma of Hong Kong’s Draft Race Discrimi-
nation Legislation, 38 H.K.L.J. 15, 18 (2008). But see Race Discrimination Ordinance,
(2008) Cap. 602, 3, § 3 (H.K.). For a critique of the process leading to the enactment of
the RDO and its comparatively weak stance against discrimination on grounds of race as
compared to other anti-discrimination legislation in Hong Kong, see Petersen, supra note
153; Loper, supra note 153; Carol J. Petersen, Racial Equality and the Law: Creating an
Effective Statute and Enforcement Model for Hong Kong, 34 H.K.L.J. 459 (2004).
154. Race Discrimination Ordinance at 1, pmbl.
155. Id. at 4–5, § 8(1)(a).
156. Id. at 4, § 5.
157. Id. at 3–4, § 4.
158. Id. at 4, § 6.
159. Id. at 4, § 7.
160. See Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602, 4, § 7 (H.K.).
161. See Race Discrimination Ordinance and I, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, http://
www.eoc.org.hk/eoc/GraphicsFolder/showcontent.aspx?content=Race%20Discrimination
%20Ordinance%20And%20I (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
162. Disability Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 487 (H.K.).
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serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of
persons in public based on race.163 Section 46 further provides that
where the incitement is accompanied by threat of physical harm, it
will constitute serious vilification and may attract a fine of up to
HK$100,000 and imprisonment for up to two years.164 These provi-
sions set out the legal framework and provisions that guarantee
protection against a range of discriminatory acts.
D. Machinery for the Implementation of Anti-Discrimination
Laws in Hong Kong
This section considers the effectiveness of the legal framework
by evaluating the availability of channels for redress under the said
anti-discrimination laws and constitutional provisions on equality
and non-discrimination. In doing so, it reviews the work of the EOC
and the impact of the local courts on the development and protection
of the rights and interests of victims of discrimination.
1. The Equal Opportunities Commission
Section 66 of the SDO constituted the EOC, which has been
tasked with the oversight and the enforcement of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws in Hong Kong.165 It has the power to investigate and
conciliate discrimination claims brought under the four ordinances
and indeed, has the statutory duty to attempt conciliation prior to
exercising its power to provide legal assistance to a party to bring
a claim in the courts when conciliation has failed.166 This raises
163. Race Discrimination Ordinance at 20, § 45.
164. Id. at 21, § 46.
165. The EOC has the mandate to receive complaints pertaining to all four anti-
discrimination laws: the SDO, FSDO, DDO, and most recently, the RDO. Race Discrimi-
nation Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.); Disability Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap.
487 (H.K.); Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 527 (H.K.); Sex Discrim-
ination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480 (H.K.). It was unfortunate that at the time of the draft-
ing of the SDO, the government rejected proposals to establish a tribunal that would hear
disputes and resolve complaints where conciliation had failed. Petersen, Equality as a
Human Right, supra note 95, at 372–73, 376, 380 (explaining that the government rejected
proposals by drafting their own competing legislation which did not include a tribunal). The
result is that impecunious claimants who lack the resources and are not backed by the
EOC may lack a remedy due to the sheer expense involved in litigating in Hong Kong
courts. Id. at 380 (clarifying that the court is the only option if conciliation fails).
166. Arguably, the mandatory requirement to attempt conciliation also serves busi-
nesses’ interests, who may prefer that such matters be dealt with behind closed doors
without the unnecessary publicity that would necessarily accompany any trial involving
allegations of discrimination. It also provides, as studies have revealed, an opportunity
for companies to wield their power in the conciliation process by pressuring complain-
ants into dropping their claims through the use of senior human resource management
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concerns about whether this invariably places an obstacle to a
woman’s right to bring a suit at law without such prior obligation to
attempt conciliation.167
Whilst the fact that there is a statutory body that is tasked with
the investigation and regulation of such complaints pertaining to
discrimination is significant, empirical research and scholarship on
the work of the EOC since its inception has revealed various prob-
lems and limitations, many of which are inherent in the statutory
set-up of the body, its restricted mandate, and most crucially, its
lack of independence.168 Taking the latter issues first, the EOC has
been criticized for its lack of institutional independence because the
Chief Executive of the HKSAR (the highest ranking official in the
administration, accountable only to the National People’s Congress
of China) appoints all its members, including the chairperson.169
Apart from the first chairperson, Miss Anna Wu, who was instru-
mental in tabling Hong Kong’s first, expansive anti-discrimination
bill in the Legislative Council in the early 1990s,170 the subsequent
appointments have been fairly conservative and are usually drawn
or in-house counsel who can prove intimidating to the layperson in a process which was
designed to preserve an equality of arms by keeping the complaint outside of the court-
room. See Petersen, supra note 139, at 401, 423. Similar issues have been encountered
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Anna Chapman, Discrimination Complaint-Handling in
New South Wales: The Paradox of Informal Dispute Resolution, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 321,
347 (2000).
167. See Petersen, supra note 139, at 401, 423. Although it is arguable that the require-
ment to conciliate prior to receiving the EOC’s assistance is a condition precedent only if
a party relies on the EOC to bring a lawsuit, where a party does not have the means and
the EOC or legal aid are the only avenues that make the prospect of bringing the per-
petrator to account possible, such a requirement can be an obstacle to the substantive
right to litigate. Id. However, with recent civil justice reform trends, it is likewise argu-
able that such a course of action is an important means to streamline cases brought to
court. The issue, however, is particularly sensitive in cases concerning discrimination and
warrants further study given the impact of a failed (or successful) conciliation attempt
on the victim and their resolve to pursue the claim through courts. Id. at 428. The pres-
sure of encountering the perpetrator during the conciliation process and the prospect of
protracted litigation can cause many claimants to relive the trauma of humiliation. See,
e.g., UN Women, supra note 60, at 96 (illustrating that appearing before truth seeking
bodies has been shown to bring about such results among victims of sexual violence). In
Hong Kong, the issue is further exacerbated by the victim’s lack of legal representation or
support when compared to the likelihood that the respondent is likely to be well-armed
with advisors and legal experts in tow. See David Luban, The Right to Legal Services, in
A READER ON RESOURCING CIVIL JUSTICE (Paterson & Goriely eds., 1996) (demonstrating
the crucial link between the right to legal representation and the right of access to justice
and equality before the law); see also F.B. & Ors. v. Dir. of Immigration, [2009] 1 H.K.C.
133, 162 (C.F.I.) (H.K.) (affirming the fundamental link between the three rights).
168. See Puja Kapai, The Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission: Calling for a
New Avatar, 39 H.K.L.J. 339, 343 (2009).
169. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, 44, Schedule 6 (H.K.).
170. This measure was tabled before the government decided to introduce its own anti-
discrimination laws one by one.
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from people formerly in the service of the government.171 This has
grossly undermined the public’s confidence in the EOC’s ability and
willingness to take issue with equality claims involving the govern-
ment.172 From the lack of procedural transparency concerning the
appointment of its members, to its funding being tied to the govern-
ment’s purse, the structural set-up bodes ill for anybody tasked with
a mandate as important as this one.173 Invariably, the EOC’s ac-
countability to the government rather than the public has also been
extensively criticized as interfering with the EOC’s institutional
mandate: its capacity for handling discrimination-related complaints
against the government. Most importantly, this framework violates
the Paris Principles,174 which require that such a body be plural and
independent in its representation.175 The Paris Principles call partic-
ularly for adequate funding and financial independence so that the
control of the purse is not used as a means to influence the work of
such an institution.176 The lack of independence crucially impacts
the ability of the institution to carry out its mandate effectively and
in a manner that wins the public’s confidence, particularly in terms
of its willingness to pursue discrimination claims against the gov-
ernment and its policies.177
Separately, the effectiveness of the enforcement machinery has
emerged as less than satisfactory from the claimants’ perspective. In
one of the most comprehensive studies of the operation of the EOC’s
legal enforcement framework for gender-related complaints to date,
Petersen, Fong, and Rush found that the process entrenched a sense
of powerlessness in the complainants given the lack of assistance
provided to them as part of the EOC’s policy to remain “neutral” in
171. Kapai, supra note 168, at 355.
172. Id. at 358.
173. See, e.g., id. at 355.
174. G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Paris
Principles]. Indeed, Hong Kong has been repeatedly called upon to establish an inde-
pendent human rights commission to oversee the implementation of human rights in
Hong Kong. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: People’s Republic of China
(including Hong Kong and Macao), Apr. 25–May 13, 2005, para. 41, ESCOR, U.N. Doc
E/C.12/1/Add.107 34th Sess. (May 13, 2005); Carole J. Petersen, The Paris Principles
and Human Rights Institutions: Is Hong Kong Slipping Further Away from the Mark?,
33 H.K.L.J. 513, 514 (2003); see also Kapai, supra note 168, at 355–56 (detailing the
numerous scandals pertaining to the EOC, tarnishing its reputation and public confi-
dence in the body).
175. Paris Principles, supra note 174, at 5, para. 2.
176. Id.
177. Although, the EOC has succeeded in securing some measure of public confidence
given its openness and success in pursuing claims against the government in the field
of sex and disability discrimination.
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the investigation process.178 This was unsatisfactory for claimants
who found the prospect that they had to face the perpetrator (espe-
cially in sexual harassment claims) particularly intimidating, daunt-
ing, and unhelpful insofar as the process itself failed to yield any
conclusive “finding” or “judgment” pertaining to the respondent’s
conduct after the investigation process is complete.179 Petersen and
her team conducted an in-depth study of 188 SDO and FSDO com-
plaints filed with the EOC.180 Of these, the majority pertained to
pregnancy-related and sexual harassment claims in the employment
context.181 Of this sample, 45% of the claims were discontinued and
only a small number (28 out of 188) were discontinued on the basis
that they did not pertain to conduct rendered unlawful under the
ordinance or were frivolous or lacking in substance.182 Although
there was no direct information available from the study as to the
specific reasons for the withdrawal of the remainder of the com-
plaints, interviews and focus groups revealed that fatigue and an
imbalance between the time invested and the prospects for a worthy
outcome are typical reasons.183 The EOC instigated a trial program
for “early conciliation” in which parties were invited to reconcile
before the investigation process was completed by the EOC, and it
found that in the majority of cases, parties were more likely to reach
an early conciliation for similar reasons.184 Claimants who were un-
successful in conciliation would be invited to apply for legal assis-
tance with the EOC or alternatively, litigate in courts if they could
afford to do so without assistance.185 Those who were unable to do
either of these would abandon their complaint.186 The EOC’s record
of assistance, however, is shockingly low at less than 4% of the
complaints received.187
The study’s findings reveal that 42% of this sample successfully
attempted conciliation.188 Whilst this appears to be a comparatively
178. This view, taken by EOC officers, as reported in the study is disappointing and,
as the authors suggest, reveals a limited and purely formal approach to equality. See
Petersen, supra note 139, at 427–28.
179. Id. at 428.
180. Id. at 424.
181. CAROLE J. PETERSEN ET AL., ENFORCING EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: INVESTIGATION
AND CONCILIATION OF DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS IN HONG KONG (2003).
182. See Petersen, supra note 139, at 424.
183. Id. at 425.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. PETERSEN ET AL., supra note 181.
187. See Petersen, supra note 153, at 474–75.
188. PETERSEN ET AL., supra note 181.
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favorable rate in terms of the reported rates for other countries,189
it is unsurprising given the obligatory requirement to attempt such
conciliation under the SDO.190 Similarly, the 80% success rate of
conciliation is likewise unsurprising given the rate of complaint
withdrawal and the reported fatigue and desire to come to early
conciliation where possible.191 Thus, these figures are not necessar-
ily indicative of the “effectiveness” of the enforcement mechanism,
but rather reveal the inherent burdens and limitations of this model
for the enforcement of such claims, particularly considering the un-
equal bargaining positions of the likely victims and respondents in
such cases.192 At best, the process yields an unworthy compromise
for those willing to see their complaints through to the end, a result
fueled by the respondent’s knowledge of the difficulties of the victim’s
financial or other situation.193 Respondents, often well-armed and ad-
vised, tend to capitalize on the pressures of the process to get the best
possible outcome from their point of view.194 There are various points
during the process when the respondent wields full power to negoti-
ate other terms and thus, there is nothing to lose by continuously
proposing unreasonable offers for the victim to reject or accept. This
is true even once litigation has commenced in court. As such, the re-
spondent remains stronger in the current model.195
Furthermore, as Petersen’s study reveals, victimization is ram-
pant in its express and subtle forms.196 Although the statutes contain
important provisions against victimization in order to ensure that
victims are not precluded from pursuing their lawful rights and rem-
edies by the discriminating party’s power, might or determination to
coerce them through financial or other means to silence or persuade
them to drop their claims, it is inevitable that in the face of the tac-
tics used by and the relative power of the respondent, the victim will
be driven towards withdrawal of the claim in many instances.197
Finally, even where conciliation is successful, the “remedy” ob-
tained is usually incommensurate to the energy, time, and personal
struggle involved in pursuing the respondents. In many respects, it
189. See Petersen, supra note 139, at 425 (citing R. Hunter & A. Leonard, The Outcomes
of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination, Ctr. for Emp’t and Labour Relations Law, Working
Paper No. 8, 1995).
190. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, 27, § 64 (H.K.).
191. Petersen, supra note 139, at 425.
192. Id. at 428 (explaining that respondent possesses most of the bargaining power).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 426 (explaining that the respondent often takes advantage of its economic
resources to choose the most highly trained employees to handle complaints).
195. Id. at 426.
196. Id. at 424 (showing that 10 of 188 complaints in the sample alleged victimization).
197. Peterson, supra note 139, at 424.
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could be argued that these failings send out an unfortunate message
about the seriousness of the conduct involved, the impact of such
conduct on victims, and the relative importance of pursuing such
claims to achieve justice in our society. At the most basic level, it
sends the signal that these types of incidents are not as serious as
other violations of the law, or alternatively, that the treatment of
particular groups of people in society on account of their differences,
is somehow acceptable or not worth putting up as much of a fight
for. That women fall into this category, along with other groups who
are routinely marginalized in free-market societies, is a reflection
of the attitude of the Hong Kong government and the level of its
commitment toward eradicating serious harms to the integrity, dig-
nity, and respect of marginalized groups. That women, as a group,
comprising almost half the population of Hong Kong, can continue
to be so marginalized speaks volumes about the extent of the govern-
ment’s commitment to eradicate gender inequality and implement
effective substantive equal protection for all.
In light of the current enforcement model, the Hong Kong
Human Rights Monitor has proposed, together with the EOC, that
an Equal Opportunities Tribunal be set up in order to facilitate a
more effective enforcement mechanism for such claims.198 Despite
this, however, the initial response in some quarters has simply been
to offer to further streamline the litigation process when these claims
get to the district courts.199 However, such a system would still be ex-
pensive and procedurally complex in terms of accessibility compared
to an Equal Opportunities Tribunal.200 However, whether and the
extent to which these suggestions result in reform of the process and
avenues for pursuing discrimination-based claims remains to be seen.
2. The Courts of the HKSAR
As discussed earlier, the courts remain open to adjudicating
claims filed by litigants with their own means or those who appear
before them with the assistance of the EOC.201 However, due to the
198. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, REVIEW ON ADJUDICATION OF EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES CLAIMS BY THE DISTRICT COURT, 2 (2010), available at http://www.judiciary
.gov.hk/en/other_info/consult_papers/eoc_consultation_document_eng.pdf.
199. Id. (detailing Civil Justice Reform).
200. Petersen, supra note 139, at 418.
201. Since the EOC does not have the mandate to deal with complaints pertaining to
the equality guarantees under the HKBL and the HKBORO, arguably, claimants who have
failed to conciliate and are unsuccessful in seeking assistance from the EOC, may still seek
legal aid if they satisfy the means and the merits test set out in the Legal Aid Ordinance,
(1997) Cap. 91, 3, §§ 5, 5A (H.K.). Furthermore, the Director of Legal Aid has the discretion
to waive the means test where the claim concerns the HKBORO. Id. at 3, § 5A.
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exorbitant costs of litigation and the statutorily mandated concil-
iation attempt which unduly lengthens the process, only a limited
number of claims have made it to the courts.202 Hong Kong courts
use international standards and jurisprudence and have generally
been receptive to arguments pertaining to the application of sub-
stantive standards of equality in reviewing objectionable govern-
ment policy where claims have been brought.203 The courts have also
held that intent to discriminate is irrelevant to the finding of unlaw-
ful discrimination.204 As such, where direct or indirect discrimina-
tion is found as a matter of fact based on the circumstances, that
would be sufficient.205 Indirect discrimination is defined as the im-
position of a condition or requirement that, although equally appli-
cable to all, results in a disproportionate and negative impact on a
person falling within a particular class.206 Where the court finds dif-
ferential treatment based on prohibited grounds, the burden shifts to
the party accused of such conduct to show that the distinctive treat-
ment was justified because it pursued a legitimate aim that was
connected to a rational objective and that the means used were pro-
portionate to the ends.207 Where this justification is demonstrated,
there is no finding of discrimination.208 Indeed, this is how the “special
measures” clause in the context of anti-discrimination legislation is
seen as an imperative of the obligation to achieve equality, as op-
posed to an “exception” to the equality principle.209
Inevitably, given the recent realization of the more comprehen-
sive implications of the concept of equality and its implementation,
202. Petersen, supra note 139, at 418.
203. See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s explication that “discrimination” includes
conduct that has the effect of differential treatment even if it is facially neutral in Leung
v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211, 236I–37A (C.A) (H.K.). The court held that
the Crimes Ordinance provision prohibiting consensual buggery until participants were
aged 21 was a form of “disguised discrimination” on the basis that, whilst it appeared to
be equally applicable to all persons, in effect, because this means of sexual expression was
the only one naturally available to male homosexual couples, it had the effect of discrimi-
nating against men who had male partners and therefore, amounted to sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. See id.
204. Sec’y for Justice v. Chan Wah, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 459, 476C (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
205. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 480, 4, § 5 (H.K.).
206. See Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602, 3–4, § 4 (H.K.); Disability
Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 487, 5, § 6 (H.K.); Family Status Discrimination
Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 527, 3–4, § 6 (H.K.); Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 4, § 5 (H.K.).
207. Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, 349A (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
It is important to note, however, that no justification is permissible where there is a find-
ing of direct discrimination since it is defined as “unfavourable treatment” of a person
falling within the class of persons that the ordinance seeks to protect against discrimina-
tion on the respective prohibited grounds. Id. at 335. However, there are exceptions that
may exempt certain practices or policies that have been provided for in the ordinances.
208. See id. at 336B.
209. Sex Discrimination Ordinance at 21, § 48.
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there is an internationally recognized sentiment that a more com-
plex approach to equality is required.210 Although the tests of direct
and indirect discrimination have worked relatively well in simpler
instances of discrimination—where a substantial body of case law
has been developed internationally and locally—arriving at a more
just outcome has proven difficult in some instances.211 This difficulty
has been most pronounced in the application of the “but for” test in
determining the existence of direct discrimination.212 This test re-
quires an assessment of whether another person similarly situated
as the claimant would have been treated in the same manner but for
the particular trait on which discriminatory treatment is alleged.213
The difficulty of identifying a suitable hypothetical “comparator”
against which to test the discriminatory nature of the policy com-
plained of has been lamented, particularly where pregnancy- related
claims are concerned.214 More recently, the problem was encountered
in the context of marital status discrimination, where an employer
dismissed a woman on the basis of her husband’s dismissal by the
same employer.215 The claimant argued that this amounted to dis-
crimination contrary to the FSDO.216 It proved difficult to establish
whether there was discrimination on grounds of marital status since
no comparator seemed suitable given that a single person would not
have been so dismissed and neither would any other married person,
except if they were married to this particular claimant’s husband.217
Thus, the differential treatment was based on her specific marital
status with respect to a particular individual.218 It was not of a gen-
eral nature wherein other similarly situated married persons could
be compared.219 Unfortunately, in the case concerned, these aspects
could not be sufficiently distinguished for the purposes of the appli-
cation of the comparator test.220 Fortunately, the Hong Kong court
210. See SANDRA FREDMAN, THE FUTURE OF EQUALITY IN BRITAIN (2002); Catherine
Albertyn, Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa, 23 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 253, 254 (2007); Beverley McLachlin, Equality: the Most Difficult Right, 14 SUP. CT.
L. REV. 17, 18 (2001).
211. See Albertyn, supra note 210, at 258.
212. See Chan, supra note 151, at 571.
213. See id.
214. M v. Sec’y for Justice, [2009] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 298, 326–28 (D.C.) (H.K.).
215. Wong Lai Wan Avril v. Prudential Assurance Co., [2009] 5 H.K.C. 494 (D.C.) (H.K.);
see Chan, supra note 151; see also Aileen McColgan, Cracking the Comparator Problem:
Discrimination, ‘Equal’ Treatment, and the Role of Comparisons, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 650, n.50 (2006).
216. See Wong Lai Wan Avril, 5 H.K.C. at 498–99.
217. See id. at 512–14.
218. See id. at 504–05.
219. See id. at 512–14.
220. See id.
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applied a broad interpretation of the concept of “marital status” or
“family status” and embarked on an inquiry of the circumstances
surrounding the discriminatory act as opposed to limiting itself to
the “mechanical” realm of the “but for” analysis.221 This broader in-
quiry in the attempt to elucidate whether there was differential
treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground is to be much wel-
comed. It is hoped that the courts will continue to recognize the need
for adopting broader investigative and interpretive approaches in
tackling difficult questions of this nature as they arise in the context
of anti-discrimination law. Achieving substantive equal protection is
necessarily a complex exercise which requires different approaches
for different people and groups for a number of reasons.
Because the Hong Kong government has not as yet implemented
gender mainstreaming across the board in its development of law
and policy, there has been no opportunity to see the special measures
provision in action. There was, however, one opportunity in which
Hong Kong courts considered its application in light of the gov-
ernment’s attempted use of the provision to justify a policy which
involved scaling the results of boys seeking entry into secondary
schools in order to place them in elite schools, to the detriment of
girls who had performed better.222 Although the court arrived at the
right decision, its approach in construing the relevant policy in terms
of its nature has been described as somewhat formalistic.223 The court
failed to comment on the broader, invidious implications of this pol-
icy in light of the relative position of girls and women in society when
compared to boys and men224 and the original purpose of the special
measures clause, which is underscored by the recognition that the
group protected under the ordinance belongs to a class that has
suffered discrimination as a matter of historic practice. As such, the
use of the special measures provision to advance the interests of
boys as a group was contrary to the purpose of the said provision.225
Although the courts have been fairly open in recognizing differ-
ent forms of discrimination and have not held back from holding
parties accountable, including where the government is the respon-
dent in the proceedings, there is some hesitation in extending the
221. Chan, supra note 151, at 571.
222. See Equal Opportunity Comm’n v. Dir. of Educ., [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 690, 738
(C.F.I.) (H.K.).
223. See Andrew Byrnes, Affirmative Action, Hong Kong Law and the SSPA, Paper Pre-
sented at Equal Opportunities in Education: Boys and Girls in the 21st Century (Nov. 8,
1999); see also Kelley Loper, Constitutional Adjudication and Substantive Gender Equality
in Hong Kong, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 149, 159 (Beverley
Baines et al. eds., 2012); Petersen, Implementing Equality, supra note 95, at 178.
224. Loper, supra note 79, at 843.
225. Id. at n.91.
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application of these principles to some areas of policy, for example,
economic policies and social welfare rights.226 In the consideration of
such cases, the Court of First Instance has, for example, categorized
the prohibited grounds into two distinctive categories, one entailing
traits such as race, caste, noble birth, membership in a political party,
gender, and the other including grounds such as ability, education,
wealth, and occupation.227 In applying this dictum, Cheung J in Kong
Yun Ming relegated the second category of traits to one where differ-
ential treatment based on one of these grounds could be justified by
a less onerous test of justification when compared to the more rigor-
ous justification test that would apply if the discriminatory behavior
was based on grounds falling within the first category.228 The grounds
in the first category are traits that one might arguably construe as
“innate” or “immutable,” and in the words of Cheung J:
matters that go to the very make up or identity of the person in
question as an individual; something that is basic, essential or
226. See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, 349E (C.F.A.)
(H.K.), where the Court of Final Appeal identified the grounds of race, sex, and sexual
orientation as those which will receive intense scrutiny to assess whether the difference
in treatment is justified. However, the practice of lower courts indicates that the level of
scrutiny will vary depending on the extent to which the basis for the treatment affects
“fundamental notions of dignity” and whether the matter implicates policy-making in the
economic or social rights spheres. It appears from this distinction that the courts are likely
to grant executive and legislative branches a wider measure of discretion in these areas.
See Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A1 (C.A) (H.K.); Yao Man Fai George
v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A2 (C.F.I.) (H.K.); Kong Yun Ming v. Dir. of Soc.
Welfare. [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 382 (C.F.I.) (H.K.); Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth. [2008]
H.K.C. 2161 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). This is not unique to Hong Kong. Courts in liberal democratic
countries around the world have generally been reluctant to interfere with government
policy insofar as the determination may impact questions of social and economic policy,
which necessarily carry financial implications. See Kong Yun Ming, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 403.
This area is seen as the exclusive prerogative of the government treasury and, in light of
the doctrine of separation of powers, firmly within the powers of the executive branch. See,
for example, Chan To Foon v. Director of Immigration, [2001] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 109, 118I (C.F.I.)
(H.K.) where the claimant sought to rely on the ICESCR in support of the claim. However,
it was held that the treaty, although incorporated into Hong Kong’s constitutional struc-
ture through Article 39 of the HKBL, remained aspirational and promotional, rather than
presenting a justiciable set of rights. See id. at 132G. Indeed, ECOSOC, concerned about
the implications of such a ruling, asked the government to reaffirm that it acknowledges
that the ICESCR creates binding obligations on the government of Hong Kong and as
such, are not merely “promotional” or aspirational in nature. See Paris Principles, supra
note 174, paras. 69–70. The government’s response to this was to accept that the ICESCR
“creates binding obligations at the international level.” HKSAR, SECOND REPORT OF THE
HKSAR OF THE PRC IN THE LIGHT OF THE ICESCR 42 (2003). One would question whether
this means that the government does not see the treaty as specifically implementable
through domestic law despite its entrenchment in Article 39, HKBL. See id.
227. Kong Yun Ming, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 404–05 (citing Lord Hoffmann in R (Carson) v.
Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, [2006] 1 A.C. 173, 182).
228. Id. at 405.
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fundamental to him/her and that goes to the core of his/her being
as a human being; something that defines the person physically
or intrinsically.229
This bifurcation of discrimination grounds and the differential
levels of scrutiny they are subjected to based on an elusive concept
such as the “centrality” of the trait to the person concerned is prob-
lematic. Discrimination on grounds falling in the second category
may well affect a person’s ability and right to live a meaningful life
of equal dignity.230 Furthermore, the varying level of scrutiny ap-
plied on these terms is likely to have a disproportionate and nega-
tive impact on women, which is not only unfortunate but critical to
note in view of the tendency of economic and social policies to work
against the interests of women as a group in many instances.231 Four
recent cases that have come before the Hong Kong courts attest to
the disproportionate impact of such policies on women.232
For example, relying on the right to social welfare233 and equality
under the HKBL and HKBORO,234 a Mainland Chinese woman mar-
ried to a Hong Kong resident whose husband died shortly after she
came to Hong Kong sought to challenge the seven-year residency re-
quirement before she could qualify as a recipient of Comprehensive
Social Security Assistance (CSSA).235 The court accepted the govern-
ment’s justification that there were economic reasons for this policy
in light of the limited availability of resources and that, as matters of
policy, issues concerning the allocation of such resources necessarily
229. Id.
230. Fredman advocates the use of equality to achieve four key objectives in order to
realize a more substantive application of the concept of equality. See SANDRA FREDMAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED 179 (2008). The first is to break the cycle of disadvantage
for marginalized communities; second, to address and redress membership-based stigma,
stereotyping, humiliation, and violence through recognition of the equal worth and dig-
nity of all human beings; third, to celebrate identity within communities and encourage
the use of affirmative action policies; and fourth, to enable full participation in society.
See id. at 10.
231. Again, this is not something that is unique to Hong Kong; numerous countries have
failed in adequately mainstreaming law and policy for the adverse impacts such provi-
sions may have for women as a class and for women as members of specific subcatego-
ries. See, e.g., Kamala Sankaran, Special Provisions and Access to Socio-Economic Rights:
Women and the Indian Constitution, 23 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 277, 290 (2007); Catherine
MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects and
‘Personal Laws,’ 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 181, 182–83 (2006).
232. See Fok Chun Wa, [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A1 (C.A.) (H.K.); Yao Man Fai George,
[2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A2 (C.F.I.) (H.K.); Kong Yun Ming, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 382 (C.F.I.)
(H.K); Raza v. Chief Exec.-in-Council, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 561 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
233. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 36 (H.K.).
234. See id. art. 25; Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 385, 8, § 8,
art. 22 (H.K.).
235. Kong Yun Ming, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 386.
288 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:255
need to be treated with a view to their long-term sustainability.236 The
court held that “[c]onstitutionally and institutionally, the courts are
not well-placed and equipped to deal with or adjudicate [such ques-
tions concerning the social welfare system].” 237 At the same time, how-
ever, the court acknowledged that the policy could be challenged for
its “infring[ement of] other constitutionally-guaranteed rights under
the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights” including any “unequal
treatment amongst residents of the [SAR] that cannot be justified,
in other words discrimination.” 238 This decision has critical implica-
tions for a number of women, particularly immigrant women, whose
marital, economic, or other status might change for the worse if they
are not able to find work or have children to fend for. The seven-
year waiting period before women in such situations can obtain social
security in light of the sudden change in circumstances is discrimi-
natory, not only on grounds of sex, but also immigration status and
potentially race or nationality.239 Because immigrant women may
experience exclusion from the employment market for a certain pe-
riod of time (in the eventuality of divorce, separation, or death of a
spouse or partner), their impoverishment as a result of this policy
needs to be critically understood and specifically addressed.
Similarly, the court in Yao Man Fai George v. Director of Social
Welfare240 held that a similar requirement that the applicant of CSSA
be a resident in Hong Kong for a continuous period of one year im-
mediately preceding the date of her/his application for the allowance
was valid on the basis that, in areas involving social or economic
policy, the court would defer to the relevant arm of the government
charged with governance in that field, except in cases in which there
was an inherently suspect ground of discrimination involved.241 It
further affirmed the differential level of scrutiny that applied in ex-
amining justifications for such policies.242 Although this case was
brought by a man, it is important to recognize the reality that the
provision has important implications for a number of women from
Mainland China who may travel back and forth on two-way permits
pending the determination of their permanent residence status or
alternatively,243 to spend extended periods of time across the border
to look after children waiting to be reunited with their families in
Hong Kong.
236. See id. at 414.
237. Id. at 399.
238. Id. at 400.
239. See id. at 395–96.
240. [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A2 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
241. Id. para. 45.
242. Id. para. 46.
243. See id. paras. 7, 33, 38.
2013] THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN HONG KONG 289
Likewise, in Raza v. Chief Executive-in-Council,244 an applicant
challenged the government’s imposition of a HK$400 levy on employ-
ers of foreign domestic helpers and its reduction of the stipulated min-
imum wage for foreign domestic helpers by the same amount.245 It
was argued that the policy amounted to a form of “disguised taxation”
levied on foreign domestic helpers and was discriminatory in that it
did not apply similarly to other foreign workers.246 The court ruled
in favor of the government on the grounds that the importation of for-
eign labor into Hong Kong was a policy area which the government
was better placed to consider in light of social needs and thus, the
government ought to be given a wide realm of discretion within which
to formulate such policy.247 This ruling also overlooks the dispropor-
tionate and negative impact of the policy on women as a group be-
cause most foreign domestic helpers tend to be women and in the
context of Hong Kong, they tend to be women belonging to particu-
lar ethnic or national identity groups.248 This places minority ethnic
women at a protracted risk of multiple discriminatory treatment in
a range of spheres.
Finally, in Fok Chun Wa v. Hospital Authority,249 a Chinese wom-
an from the Mainland married to a Hong Kong permanent resident
and awaiting her one-way permit to join him, delivered her baby in
Hong Kong whilst on a two-way permit.250 The hospital categorized
her as falling into the group of “Non-Eligible Persons” for the purposes
of determining the obstetric costs associated with her delivery.251 This
resulted in her having to pay significantly higher costs compared to
other residents.252 She challenged the policy in court on the ground
that her circumstances were different from Non-Eligible Persons be-
cause unlike them, she had a direct family connection in Hong Kong
which should allow her to be classified as an Eligible Person.253 How-
ever, in line with the courts’ approach in earlier cases and the cate-
gorization of the discriminatory treatment as falling in the “second
category” of the grounds enumerated in R (Carson) v. Secretary of
State for Work and Pensions, the court held that this was a matter
244. [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 561 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
245. See id. at 566I–67A.
246. See id. at 569H.
247. See id. at 593I–95A.
248. See id. at 580B.
249. [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A1 (C.A.) (H.K.); see also Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth. [2008]
1 H.K.C. 2161 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
250. See Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.C. paras. 7, 9.
251. See id. paras. 2, 11.
252. See id. para. 11.
253. See id.
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of “broad social policy” to be deferred to the government.254 It is in-
teresting that the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the
case notes that of all babies born to Non-Eligible Persons, 75% of
them were born to Hong Kong permanent resident fathers.255 Thus,
the question of whether the distinction between children born to a
permanent resident woman and children born to a non-permanent
resident whose partner is a Hong Kong permanent resident is justifi-
able on grounds of economic and social policy needs to be critically
assessed. It is also important to closely review the situation with re-
gards to married and unmarried women and their treatment. It would
constitute unjustifiable marital status discrimination if women who
were married were to be treated more favorably under a revised pol-
icy as opposed to unmarried mothers in using marriage to verify the
degree of “permanence” of such family connection if this is seen as
a ground based on which the differential treatment between the two
groups of women can no longer be justified.256
In light of recent jurisprudence that has highlighted the major
policy gaps that detrimentally impact the fundamental rights of
women, it is imperative that the courts apply greater scrutiny to
policies, at least with a view toward signaling to the relevant gov-
ernment departments that there is a higher threshold they will be
held to account for in light of the negative and disproportionate im-
pact of many of these policies on women as a group. In this vein, it
would also be desirable for the courts to evaluate the basis for the
bifurcated grounds of discrimination and to reassess whether differ-
ent levels of scrutiny applied to economic or social policies, as op-
posed to discrimination based on immutable traits, can be justified.
Indeed, the government’s failure to effectively implement gen-
der mainstreaming at various levels renders it even more important
for the courts to scrutinize law and policy in all areas closely with a
view toward performing its primary function as a check on the exer-
cise of power by the other government branches and to ensure that
fundamental rights are fully protected. More importantly, the role
of Hong Kong courts has become increasingly significant given its
unique position as a guardian of minority interests in a political
framework crippled by a lack of democratic progress and the conse-
quent under-representation of such groups in law and policy-making
processes.257 In these circumstances, if courts fail claimants in cases
254. See id. paras. 74–78.
255. See id. para. 33.
256. See, e.g., Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.C. para. 13.
257. See Kapai, supra note 86, at 73–74, for a detailed elucidation of this argument
advocating the legitimacy of the courts’ application of heightened standards of scrutiny
in judicial review applications involving the rights of minorities.
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similar to those brought in recent years, these victims of systemic
and structural discrimination will continue to be marginalized. The
strained relationship between the people and the executive govern-
ment has put Hong Kong courts at the forefront of rights-related de-
velopments.258 Without the courts stepping up to their role as the only
guardian with the power to effectively protect against excesses of the
majority and the government, there is little prospect that minorities
will ever extricate themselves from the cycle of disadvantage.259
Of further significance is the need to recognize that certain
groups of women face intersectional discrimination. This means that
they face discrimination on multiple fronts because they fall within
two or more categories of persons who are routinely discriminated
against. Women who are immigrants, racial or ethnic minorities, suf-
fer from a disability, are unemployed or single parents, for example,
are not only discriminated against on the basis of their sex, but the im-
pact of discrimination on grounds of sex is often compounded by their
membership in another marginalized community.260 The cases above
aptly illustrate this concept of intersectional discrimination.261 Con-
sider, for example, that the unequal treatment of the non-permanent
resident mother in Fok Chun Wa was extended to her on the basis
of her immigration status and (invariably) her sex because men do
not need obstetric services.262 Likewise, the foreign domestic helpers
in Raza and Vallejos faced unequal treatment on grounds of their
immigration status, economic class, occupation, and indirectly, their
sex, given that most domestic helpers tend to be women.263 More-
over, it is likely that the policy discriminates against individuals on
grounds of race or nationality because domestic helpers in Hong
Kong come from particular countries within the region.264
However, the courts did not consider any of these cases as
instances of multiple discrimination.265 Nor did the courts seek to
deconstruct the impact of such complex and layered discrimination
258. See id. at 54.
259. See id. at 51–52.
260. See, e.g., Vallejos Evangeline Banao v. Comm’r of Registration, [2012] 1 H.K.C.
433, paras. 2, 6 (C.A.) (H.K); Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. A1,
paras. 1–2 (C.A.) (H.K.); Raza v. Chief Exec.-in-Council, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 561, 566G–
67H (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
261. See Vallejos, 1 H.K.C. paras. 2, 6; Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 1–2; Raza,
3 H.K.L.R.D. at 566G–67H.
262. Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 1–2; see Alvin So, Cross Border Families in Hong
Kong: The Role of Social Class and Politics, 35 CRIT. ASIAN STUD. 515, 528, 531 (2003).
263. Vallejos, 1 H.K.E.C. paras. 2, 5–6; Raza, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 566–67.
264. See So, supra note 262, at 530.
265. Vallejos, 1 H.K.C. para. 10; Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 3–5; Raza, 3
H.K.L.R.D. at 566G–67H.
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on particular groups of women.266 Indeed, this would have been open
to the courts, not only on the basis of the existing anti-discrimina-
tion statutes but also on the basis of provisions in the HKBL and
HKBORO.267 Intersectional discrimination may be considered as fall-
ing within the meaning of the phrase “other status.” Indeed, ECOSOC
notes that “[s]ome individuals or groups of individuals face discrim-
ination on more than one of the prohibited grounds, for example
women belonging to an ethnic or religious minority. Such cumulative
discrimination has a unique and specific impact on individuals and
merits particular consideration and remedying.” 268 The lack of a sub-
stantive approach to applying anti-discrimination law and equality-
related constitutional provisions grossly undermines the potential
of women to extricate themselves from their disadvantaged position
in society and to compete on equal terms with others.269
IV. OTHER PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF WOMEN
There are numerous other laws in Hong Kong that protect the
interests of women. For example, the Domestic Violence Ordinance270
(DVO) seeks to protect individuals against violence in intimate or
family contexts; the Crimes Ordinance271 (CO) and the Offenses
Against Persons Ordinance (OAPA)272 criminalize violent and harm-
ful behavior such as rape, sexual assault, physical assault, griev-
ous bodily harm, murder, and other behavior causing injury and
death and are also used alongside DVO provisions where the acts
concerned meet the standards required for criminal liability to
attach; and the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance273 (MCO), to name
but a few.
Although most of these are general in nature in that they apply
regardless of the gender of the victim seeking relief under the said
266. Vallejos, 1 H.K.E.C. para. 10; Fok Chun Wa, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 3–5; Raza, 3
H.K.L.R.D. at 566–67.
267. See, e.g., XIANGGANG JIBEN FA arts. 24–25 (H.K.); Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383, 8, § 8, art. 22.
268. See ECOSOC, supra note 142, 174, paras. 7–10 (emphasis added) (highlighting
the need to “prevent, diminish and eliminate the conditions and attitudes which cause
or perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination.”).
269. For a detailed presentation of the impact of intersectional discrimination on women
victims of domestic violence and how the failure to develop suitable law and policy to pro-
vide substantive equal protection against such violence can result in severe consequences
and even death, see Puja Kapai, supra note 223.
270. Domestic Violence Ordinance, (2010) Cap. 189 (H.K.).
271. Crimes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 200 (H.K.).
272. Offenses Against the Person Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 212 (H.K.).
273. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 179 (H.K.).
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ordinances, it is recognized that some of the provisions are more
likely to impact the rights and circumstances of women.274 However,
these laws have had to be reconsidered in light of changing circum-
stances, culture, and calls for reforms that have recently been met
in some respects.
For example, while the reported rate of violence against women
in Hong Kong is lower than that in other countries, eleven out of
every 100 women experience physical violence during their lifetime,
with six out of every 100 women experiencing physical violence at
the hands of their husband or partner during their lifetime.275 The
number of reported instances of battering between spouses in Hong
Kong showed an increase from 970 to 5,575 for women between 1998
and 2008.276 The number of women who reported rape and indecent
assault during the same period increased from 1,263 to 1,406.277 In
light of this dramatic increase of incidents and reporting, it was ar-
gued that the DVO, first enacted in 1986, was outdated and failed to
adequately address the various forms of domestic violence that women
were experiencing. Furthermore, it was argued that in light of the
increased incidence of cohabiting as opposed to living together only
in the context of marital relationships, which presents an equal risk
of violence in intimate spheres, there was a need to update the DVO
to extend protection across a range of relationships and that such
protection should not be tied to the temporality of the relationship
given that people now move in and out of relationships. The govern-
ment’s long-held position was that many of the acts, if not covered
by the DVO, were caught by the criminal law in any event and thus,
there was no pressing need for reform. The lobbying efforts of numer-
ous groups who pushed for civil remedies against domestic violence
given the sensitivities involved in such a case, the need to broaden
the scope of the DVO’s applicability to other filial and past intimate
relationships and the need for a new working definition of domestic
violence as well as the CEDAW Committee’s reiteration of the need
to ensure adequate protection against domestic violence finally led
to amendments to the ordinance.
The reform has been welcomed for its expansion of the scope of
relationships which are now covered by the DVO, including same-
sex cohabitees, its extension to past relationships and its improve-
ments in terms of accessibility to a range of court remedies and the
274. See, e.g., Crimes Ordinance at 35, § 118.
275. UN Women, supra note 60, at 131.
276. WOMEN’S COMM’N, HONG KONG WOMEN IN FIGURES 50 (2009), available at http://
www.women.gov.hk/download/library/report/HK_Women2009_e.pdf.
277. Id. at 51.
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arrest powers of the police where court orders have been violated.278
There remain, however, deep-rooted problems in victims’ accessibil-
ity to timely police and social welfare assistance due to failings at
the policy level, as well as the lack of sufficient resources to assist
women in pursuing available remedies. For example, the costs of ob-
taining an injunction still remain prohibitively high for women, par-
ticularly where they are economically dependent on the perpetrator
of the abuse or have left the family home with their children. More-
over, if women make the decision of seeking temporary shelter in
government-run or other shelters, there must be provisions for their
right to housing and social welfare in order to make their independ-
ence from their spouse sustainable.279 Moreover, single women’s need
for government housing is relegated in priority to the pressing needs
of married couples and families with children. Under the current
system, women victims hardly have a real choice when it comes to
leaving the abuser. In its most recent Concluding Observations on
Hong Kong, the CEDAW Committee once again highlighted the need
for the government to more effectively address domestic violence in
society.280 It has called on the government to provide a budget over-
view to enable the CEDAW Committee to ensure that resources are
fully applied to tackle this acute problem.281
In other reform, the Crimes Ordinance was amended to remove
the marital rape exemption that existed as a defense against a charge
of rape of a woman by her lawful husband.282 The Evidence Ordi-
nance283 has also been amended to remove the “rape shield,” the need
for a special direction to the jury or corroboration of the victim’s tes-
timony in sexual offense cases, and spouses are privileged against in-
crimination of their spouses in general and in criminal proceedings.284
These changes have been long coming, and in light of the exist-
ing legal and policy framework, are hardly sufficient. There is a dire
need to implement a policy of gender mainstreaming at all levels
278. For an overview of key amendments, see Kapai, supra note 144.
279. See, e.g., Polly Hui, Families in Trouble Not Getting Help, Says Inquiry, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 30, 2004, http://www.scmp.com/article/476113/families-trouble-not
-getting-help-says-inquiry.
280. See Concluding Comments, supra note 108, paras. 35–36.
281. See id. In 2004, the government was severely criticized for the lack of coordina-
tion between social service agencies and the police, which led to the murder of a woman
and her daughters just hours after she had sought police assistance after leaving a
government-run shelter for fear for her own and her children’s well-being. See Hui,
supra note 279.
282. Robyn Emerton, Marital Rape and the Related Sexual Offices: A Review of the
Proposed Amendments to Part XII of the Crimes Ordinance, 31 H.K.L.J. 415, 423 (2000).
283. Evidence Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 8 (H.K.).
284. Id. at 2–3, 4B.
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although the government has long promised to do so and has even
set up a Women’s Commission with the mandate to oversee this
task. Despite this, much remains to be done.285 Although the govern-
ment prides itself on the development of a gender mainstreaming
checklist, the application of this checklist to the initiatives of vari-
ous departments, the training of staff in various departments in gen-
der sensitivity, raising awareness and the empowerment of women
through public education, and the benchmark it has set for women’s
participation in advisory and statutory bodies,286 these initiatives
are piecemeal and do not represent a genuine and focused effort at
redressing the historic and persistent discrimination faced by women.
To ensure effective measures for structural changes that apply sub-
stantive measures to unravel the impact of past discrimination, a
systematic approach to a change in the policy development processes,
including impact assessments of law and policy, and the implemen-
tation of laws that offer substantive protection to women in areas
where they face particular risks of being marginalized by general
norms is required. This can best be met by instituting a procedure
similar to that required under the United Kingdom’s Human Rights
Act of 1998 and the Equality Act 2010, both of which mandate that
an Equality and Human Rights Impact Assessment be carried out
with respect to proposed legislation and policy by relevant govern-
ment bureaus before the measure can be enacted formally.287
V. PUTTING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK INTO CONTEXT
There are numerous areas in which the government has long
been dragging its feet and a brief overview of some key areas that
beckon urgent reform reveals that the lack of a systematic policy
through which gender-based impact analyses of law and policy is
mandated has allowed various groups of women to fall through the
cracks. For example, the continuation of the functional constituen-
cies in Hong Kong’s legislative body has gender equality implications
given that men are more widely represented in the professional
classes and therefore, as corporate and individual voters, functional
constituency arrangements work to the advantage of men. Women
285. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON WELFARE SERVICES, POLICY INITIATIVES OF LABOUR
AND WELFARE BUREAU IN PROMOTING WELL-BEING AND INTERESTS OF WOMEN (2010), avail-
able at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/ws/papers/ws1020cb2-23-2-e.pdf.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR CONST. AFFAIRS, JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, HUMAN LIVES, A HANDBOOK FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, D.C.A. 55/06, at 52–53
(U.K.) (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/human-rights/human
-rights-handbook-for-public-authorities.pdf.
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who are not professionals or who are homemakers suffer as they
have only one vote as opposed to two (or even three in the case of
some corporate voter representatives).288 An even more telling indi-
cator of the representativeness of women under this system is the
fact that there have only ever been eight functional constituency
legislators who were women, and there is an average rate of return
of three female legislators from this voting component every election
cycle, only recently improving to return five female legislators in
2000 and 2004, respectively.289
In terms of political representation of women by women in other
bodies, note that in the District, Executive, and Legislative Councils,
women comprised less than 20% of the total number of elected can-
didates in each of the three bodies.290 It is only most recently that
the Chief Executive Leung Chun Ying’s incoming government has,
for the first time since the handover, a woman as its Chief Secretary
as well as a female chair of its Executive Council.291
Likewise, women are more likely to be single parents than men292
and also, more widely represented in those classified as “poor,” 293
more likely to be unemployed,294 or receive unequal pay for work of
equal value when compared to men,295 and they are less likely to sit on
288. For a general overview of the workings of the functional constituency system in
Hong Kong, see SIMON N.M. YOUNG & ANTHONY LAW, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
HONG KONG’S FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES, FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCY RESEARCH
PROJECT 26–42 (2004), available at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/Docs/FCsreport.pdf; SIMON
N.M. YOUNG, HONG KONG’S FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES: LEGISLATORS AND ELECTIONS
24 (2004), available at http://www.civic-exchange.org/eng/upload/files/200503_Functional
Constituencies.pdf. The September 2012 elections are the first in which each individual
will now be entitled to two votes: one in the geographic constituency and the other in the
functional constituency which compromises professional classes, but for the first time,
for those who do not fall into a pre-existing functional constituency, they are entitled to
vote for another list of candidates. See, e.g., Press Release, Legislative Council, Statement
by the Chief Secretary for Administration, Mr. Henry Tang, on the Consultation Document
on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council
in 2012 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/ca
/papers/ca1126-ppr091118-e.pdf.
289. See YOUNG, supra note 288, at 12–13.
290. WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276, at 40–41.
291. See Fiona Law, DJ China Appoints Carrie Lam as Chief Secretary, John Tsang
Financial Secretary, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, June 27, 2012.
292. WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276, at 10.
293. In 22 out of the 25 countries for which data are available, women are more likely
than men to live in conditions of poverty. See UN Women, supra note 60, at 104.
294. See UN Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth
of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, 156 (2010) available at http://hdr.undp
.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/, which reveals that whilst 79.2% of men participate in
the labor market in Hong Kong, only 60.5% of women do.
295. WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276, at 25.
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boards of corporations296 or other influential bodies.297 Three segments
of the Hong Kong population that have grown in recent years are
older women, single mothers and female foreign domestic helpers.298
Indeed, the Hong Kong government has itself acknowledged
some of these issues in its report to the CEDAW Committee, recog-
nizing that “obstacles still remain to the advancement of women in
Hong Kong.” 299 It acknowledged the difficulties that elder women ex-
perienced in rejoining the labor force, the fact that a larger propor-
tion of women were engaged in low income jobs, casual labor, and that
there were growing income disparities between men and women.300
These figures speak to the dire need for more to be done in
order to ensure that the human rights of women are adequately pro-
tected and enforced. The limited number of challenges brought to
the courts is no indication of the lack of need for reform. If anything,
they reveal a severe lack of accessibility to justice and reparations
in light of the figures that are depictive of the inequalities experi-
enced by women in multiple spheres.301 They merely put into context
the limited impact of the current framework despite the existence
of protections and frameworks that facilitate access to justice and
law reform and their inadequacies by failing to achieve these crucial
objectives and protecting women’s interests effectively.
CONCLUSION
Internationally, it appears that Hong Kong ranks relatively well
on two of the United Nations’ measures relating to the assessment
296. See SHALINI MAHTANI ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS: HANG SENG INDEX 2009 (2009)
available at http://www.communitybusiness.org/images/cb/publications/2009/WOB.pdf.
The study found that with a rate of 8.9% representation of women on boards, whilst Hong
Kong compares favorably to the likes of the Australia, it fell far behind in this regard
compared to the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Canada, who had
representations in the double digits up to 15%. Id. at 16. The women interviewed cited
various reasons, including the “invisible filter” where they would themselves pull back
from promotions or higher positions due to family obligations or the fact that they found
they were not as well networked as the men, also there was a perception of the talent
pool among women being limited. Id. at 5. Interestingly, of all the women surveyed, only
one was supportive of the use of quotas as adopted in some European countries in order
to address the situation. Id. The others shied away from preferential treatment and pre-
ferred other ways of improving female representation on corporate boards. Id.
297. Women comprised 27.6% of the composition of all statutory and advisory bodies
in 2008. WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276, at 43. See also YOUNG, LEGISLATURES AND
ELECTIONS, supra note 288.
298. WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276, at 1, 3, 10.
299. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the CEDAW, para. 9, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CHN/5-6/Add.1 (June 14, 2004).
300. Id.
301. See WOMEN’S COMM’N, supra note 276.
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of gender disparities in a country.302 For example, in 2007, Hong
Kong ranked 22nd out of 155 countries on the Gender-Related
Development Index.303 However, the analysis in this paper points
to the need for a critical review of our laws and institutional frame-
works for protecting the human rights of women. In addition to
having strong rule of law and constitutional and domestic pro-
tections enshrined in legislation to protect the rights of women, it
is equally important that the framework itself be predicated on a
system that enables reform in light of international developments
and institutionalizes procedures and structures that achieve the
goals of equal protection at a substantive level. The development
of a substantive and transformative approach to equality has un-
fortunately, not been fully incorporated at relevant levels of gover-
nance in Hong Kong to facilitate the critical shift towards a more
systemic and entrenched regime that would ensure that the rights
of women are fully protected. Measures, such as the adoption of an
equality and human rights impact assessment framework through
which law and policy is vetted at all levels of government depart-
ments and ministries, would go a long way towards bridging the
gap between the sexes. Moreover, the role of the EOC and the
courts needs to be evaluated in light of the circumstances women,
as victims of discrimination and unequal treatment, face in mul-
tiple spheres.304 It is unsatisfactory to leave decisions about the
plight of the powerless in the hands of the powerful majority.305
Indeed, this is precisely where courts need to step in to apply sub-
stantive equality measures to adjudge the impact of government
policies on marginalized communities whose particular vulnera-
bilities exacerbate their experience of inequality.306 The tools that
enable the courts to do so already exist in the HKBL and the
HKBORO. This mandate to apply equality provisions rigorously
must extend to economic and social policy. Anything less than that
violates the constitutional and human rights guarantee of equality
and non-discrimination.
Furthermore, the government needs to seriously consider wheth-
er the adoption of special measures is necessary in key areas relating
to political representation and professional and other opportunities
to address the historical discrimination that women have suffered
302. Id. at 56.
303. Id.
304. See supra Part III.D.1 for a discussion of the EOC and the courts.
305. See supra Part III.D.1.
306. See supra Part III.D.1.
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as a group and to promote fully their empowerment and inclusion
in society as full and equal members.307
In terms of where to begin, the government could start by tak-
ing its cue from the Concluding Observations issued by the CEDAW
Committee over the last two reporting cycles with a view toward ad-
dressing fully, and in good faith, the recommendations made by the
Committee.308 Moreover, it should note the burgeoning civil society
movement in Hong Kong and review the various reports submitted
by the numerous NGOs who work on different aspects of women’s
rights. Their insights are crucial to raise the government’s aware-
ness to better inform their policy development and law-making ini-
tiatives. There should also be a greater culture of cooperation and
openness between the government and such organizations so as to
facilitate a good faith exchange of views on upcoming policy and legi-
slative changes so that interested groups can speak on an informed
basis to impact proposed changes.
Finally, the government would be well-served to begin charting
figures that depict the plight of women who are members of other
marginalized groups.309 For example, it should develop tools to ob-
tain figures on migrant women, women belonging to ethnic, national
or religious minority groups, disabled women, older women and sex-
ual minorities. Women in these groups represent some of the most
vulnerable sectors of the population in Hong Kong and remain
severely under-protected and under-represented.310 Effective data
collection tools will further the government’s ability to assess the
impact of law and policy more comprehensively and enable it to de-
vise specific policies that address the vulnerabilities of these groups.
Intersectional analysis has proved to be an immensely useful tool to
identify populations at risk on multiple grounds of discrimination
and to assess the effectiveness of measures to enable substantive
equal protection.311 This data would enable better benchmarking of
standards and would facilitate better planning and budget alloca-
tion in times where resource allocation is the key to implementing
effective and sustainable change.312
The achievement of equality in the substantive and transforma-
tive sense is a journey that is long and calls for critical self-reflection.
307. See supra Part III.D. for a discussion of special measures the government is em-
powered to enact.
308. See Concluding Comments, supra note 108.
309. See supra Part III.D.
310. See supra Part III.D.
311. See supra Part III.D.
312. See supra Part III.D.
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We are committed to internationally recognized standards and have
witnessed the impact of the empowerment of women on the well-being
of society as a whole. The state of inequality that persists in Hong
Kong implores us to charge fully forward to internalize these impor-
tant principles and to heed the lessons of international successes
reflecting the outcomes of the implementation of these standards
so that the equal rights of women can be substantively recognized
to deliver the promise of equal respect, worth, and dignity of all
human beings.
